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Secrecy is a form of power. The ability to protect a secret, to preserve
one's privacy, is a form of power. The ability to penetrate secrets, to
learn them, to use them, is also a form of power. Secrecy empowers,
secrecy protects, secrecy hurts. The ability to learn a person's secrets
without her knowledge-to pierce a person's privacy in secret-is a greater
power still.' - A. Michael Froomkin
Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the
enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of
ordinary men is foreknowledge - Sun Tzu
I. NTRODUCTION
EVERYONE HAS SOMETHING TO HIDE. Some have more than others;
some for more sinister reasons than others. Thus, the impetus for cryptog-
raphy, the ancient craft of "secret writing," becomes all the more clear.
For centuries, cryptography has served as the consummate shroud. Except
now, it has gone high-tech. Once obscure and largely relegated to a select
sphere consisting of "spooks,"3 soldiers, statesmen, and a few mathemati-
cians, cryptography has emerged from its cloak of secrecy, as a matter of
discussion and as a matter of use. This age-old craft, tracing its roots to
ancient Egypt, is now readily combined with modem computer technology
to become more powerful than ever before, arguably more dangerous than
ever before. As a result, encryption technology is regarded as a critical
issue in the discussion over control and protection of information in this
"information age."4 As a new millenium dawns, technology, in this case
I A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, The Clipper Chip,
and The Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 712 (1995) [hereinafter Metaphor].
2 SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 144 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford University
Press, 1963).
' A "spook" is a person involved in intelligence activity, typically intelligence
collection. The word "spook" is also commonly used as an adjective to describe,
"equipment, operations, or agencies involved in intelligence activity." NORMAN POLMAR
& THOMAS B. ALLEN, SPY BOOK 528 (1997).
4 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 19 (Kenneth W. Dam & Herb S. Lin eds., National Academy
Press, 1996) [hereinafter CRISIS] ('The information age is enabled by computing and
communications technologies (collectively known as information technologies) whose
rapid evolution is almost taken for granted today. Computing and communications
systems appear in virtually every sector of the economy and increasingly in homes and
other locations"). The National Research Council is a part of the National Academy of
Sciences. Id. at VI. Supremacy in "information" will likely serve as a determinant of
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millenium dawns, technology, in this case encryption technology, has
again revealed itself to be both friend and foe.5
Historically, those most genuinely interested in cryptography have
been the governments of the world, or, more properly, their respective
intelligence communities and militaries.6 Typically, emphasis has been on
the protection of state or military secrets and, of course, the collection
and exploitation of adversaries' secrets However, with the rapid advanc-
es in computer technology over the last fifty years and the new vulner-
ability that technology has brought with it, encryption technology has
become a valued tool for both businesses and individuals in the protection
of proprietary and personal information!
political, or even economic reasons is merely the collection of information. See LocK
L JOHNSON, SECRET AGENciEs 2 (1996) (stating that "intelligence is information, a
tangible product collected and interpreted in order to achieve a sharper image of
political and military conditions worldwide").
' To be sure, technology has always been a source of both good and evil, progress
and regression. However, recent advancements in computer technology have made
encryption technology an even greater friend, an even greater foe. Encryption is now
easier to use, cheaper to acquire, and generally more accessible to a broad spectrum of
people and organizations, who, quite naturally, and quite historically, are capable of
both good and evil. See Dorothy E. Denning & William E. Baugh, Jr., Key Escrow
Encryption Policies and Technologies, 41 Viui. L. REV. 289, 289 (1996) [hereinafter
Key Escrow] ("In today's information age, encryption is considered essential to ensure
the security of electronic data and transactions. At the same time, however, there is
growing recognition that the spread of powerful encryption technology is not entirely
beneficial').
6 See CRISIS, supra note 4, at 53. See also HARRY HOWE RANSOM, CENTRAL
INTfELmEGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURrTY 116 (1959) ("Problems as old as intelligence
itself are the secure communicating of secret information and the interception of such
information transmitted by foreign governments or their espionage agents. The use of
professional code makers and code breakers is perhaps as old as diplomacy and
espionage").
7 See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORrTHMs, AND
SOURCE CODE IN C, Preface, XIX (2d ed., 1996) (noting that "[flor many years ...
cryptography was the exclusive domain of the military. The National Security Agency
and its counterparts in the former Soviet Union, England, France, Israel, and elsewhere,
have spent billions of dollars in the very serious game of securing their own communi-
cations while trying to break everyone else's . . . . While classical cryptography has
been long used by ordinary citizens, computer cryptography was the exclusive domain
of the world's militaries since World War I. Today, state-of-the-art computer cryptogra-
phy is practiced outside the secured walls of the military agencies").
8 See Sean M. Flynn, A Puzzle Even The Codebreakers Have Trouble Solving: A
Clash of Interests Over The Electronic Encryption Standard, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 217, 218 (1995). Banking, for example, uses encryption to protect ATM (automat-
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In the United States a battle has emerged - code makers versus
code breakers.9 On one hand is the government, code breakers, charged
with the heavy burden of protecting public safety."0 On the other hand,
there are the code makers, which include a potpourri of interests - for
example, corporations or companies interested in protecting proprietary in-
formation or confidential records, computer industry executives drawn to
the exploitation of a potentially very profitable technology, and those
concerned with protecting individual privacy and freedom of speech."
All of these interests, whether it be government, business or individ-
ual, however, are not necessarily at odds; although, this is often difficult
to perceive given the level of invective surrounding the debate. Secure
communications, secure data storage, individual privacy and a robust
economy are with little doubt within the most basic national interest.
Bus. 217, 218 (1995). Banking, for example, uses encryption to protect ATM (automat-
ed teller machines) passwords and electronic funds transfers. The move away from
largely cash-dominated transactions to a "digital cash" world portends even greater use
of encryption in banking. Businesses wanting to protect commercial and trade secrets
are increasingly making use of encryption. See Metaphor, supra note 1, at 719-34
(sketching current uses and future needs of encryption to secure communications and
maintaining data security).
9 See Dorothy E. Denning, Encryption Policy and Market Trends, (visited Mar. 12,
1998) <http://guru.cosc.georgetown.edu/-denningcrypto/Trends.html#1> thereinafter
Encryption Policy] (arguing that the "driving forces behind encryption policy and
technology are served by two opposing functions: code making and code breaking").
Denning uses the term "code making" to refer to the use and development of encryp-
tion products. Whereas, code breaking means "acquiring access to the plaintext of
encrypted data by some means other than the normal decryption process used by the
intended recipient(s) of the data." Id.
"o There is little doubt that the U.S. government is both a substantial maker and
breaker of cryptography. The United States National Security Agency is charged with
a dual duty - making U.S. code unbreakable, while at the same time breaking
opposing code with impunity. See Online Encryption Technology: Hearing on S. 377,
A Bill to Loosen the Export Restrictions on Encryption Technology Before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 105th Cong. (Mar. 19, 1997)
[hereinafter Online Encryption Technology: A Bill to Loosen Restrictions] (written state-
ment by William P. Crowell, Deputy Director, National Security Agency). However, in
the debate over control of cryptography, the government's primary interest has been in
maintaining their already preeminent capability in breaking cryptographic code - that
is, protect national security by exploiting signals intelligence gleaned from adversaries'
cryptography. See CRISIS, supra note 4, at 46-48, 128.
" These categories are clearly not fully representative of the numerous interests and
stakeholders involved in the debate over cryptographic controls, but the dichotomy does
serve to put the two primary sides into a broad but informative perspective. Additional-
ly, it is important to remember that many of these interests invariably overlap.
290 [V/ol. 30:287
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However, "[t]he greatest dilemma arises from the fact that techniques that
protect against illicit eavesdropping and data theft also threaten to prevent
licit access to communications and data by law enforcement and intelli-
gence agencies."' 2 This dilemma strikes at the core of the debate about
national security controls on encryption technology.
A central concern of this Note is to present and briefly critique
significant challenges to the U.S. export control regime governing encryp-
tion technology. However, principally, the survey of recent challenges to
the control of encryption will ultimately serve as the necessary preface to
consideration of the question of national security, as it relates to encryp-
tion technology. Specifically, this Note examines legislative efforts to
liberalize export licensing controls and constitutional court challenges to
limit or eliminate their effect. This Note makes no attempt, though, to
explicitly argue for or against decontrol of encryption; rather, this Note
presents the relevant legal and legislative challenges to continued control
of encryption technology as a backdrop to the presentation of the national
security perspective. The national security perspective, long misunderstood
and consistently misrepresented, suggests that further proliferation'3 of
encryption, principally, strong encryption,'4 presents a credible and
2 See A. Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over
Cryptographic Key "Escrow," 1996 U. CMr. LEGAL F. 15, 16 [hereinafter Planet
Clipper]. As Froomkin also aptly points out, this "policy dilemma is especially acute
in the United States because widespread encryption imposes a particularly severe cost
on U.S. intelligence-gathering capabilities . . . .U.S. [signals]-intelligence capabilities
are presumed to be the best in the world; if so, the U.S. has the most to lose from
a move towards a world in which communications traffic is routinely protected with
encryption so strong that it cannot be decrypted easily, and perhaps not at all. Wide-
spread high-quality encryption not only lessens the U.S. government's ability to eaves-
drop on foreign communications, but threatens to make it difficult, perhaps impossible,
to conduct traffic analysis." Id.
," Any reference to "proliferation" herein is a distinct reference to further pro-
liferation outside the borders of the United States. Arguably, attempts to control the ex-
port of cryptographic products also limit to one degree or another domestic prolifera-
tion.
,4 "Strong cryptography refers to cryptographic systems that are very difficult to
break." CRISIS, supra note 4, at 382. Strong cryptography is considered encryption
with a key length longer than 40-bits and the term will be used as such herein. See
CRISIS, supra note 4, at 121. While the U.S. government controls, to one extent or
another, all export of encryption technology, regardless of strength, their primary
concern and arguably their focus is control of strong encryption. Id. at 117-18 (noting
that the weaker encryption enjoys more liberal export than strong encryption). See also
infra note 57 for further discussion of strong encryption. This Note's focus is similarly
on strong encryption. However, strong encryption is an inherently relative and fluid
concept. See SCHNEIR, supra note 7, at 8. "Cryptography is more concerned with
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recognizable threat to U.S. national interests, and export restrictions, at
present, provide the most effective means to blunt that threat and there-
fore are necessary. While, arguably, the national security perspective is
not, per se, a legal argument for or against decontrol, it stands to form
the bedrock foundation for upholding controls on encryption, whether the
context is a policy or a legal." Consequently, its presentation is a neces-
sary predicate to any assessment of the validity or invalidity of the U.S.
control regime on encryption technology.
Part II of this Note provides a background of the relevant history,
terms, and mechanics of cryptography. Part I reviews prior and current
U.S. policy and law regarding cryptography. Part IV examines recent
challenges to the government's crypto 6 control regime. Specifically, Part
IV looks at pending legislation before Congress to further liberalize
export controls governing encryption technology. Additionally, several
court cases challenging the constitutionality of the controls are reviewed.
Part V presents the national security perspective, principally delineating
the specific threats that further proliferation poses to U.S. national securi-
ty. Finally, the inevitable conclusion is that further proliferation of strong
encryption presents a significant risk to national security, and, consequent-
ly, efforts to completely decontrol crypto are at best, unwise, at worst,
rash and foolhardy. However, this conclusion understands that efforts to
cryptosystems that are computationally infeasible to break. An algorithm is considered
computationally secure (sometimes called strong) if it cannot be broken with available
resources, either current or future." Id.
"s Compare Encryption Export: Hearing on Encryption and H.R. 695 Before the
House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and the House
International Relations Committee (May 8), 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Robert S.
Litt, Deputy Assistant Attorney General) (testifying that while the Clinton Administra-
tion supports the proliferation of robust encryption for the protection of privacy and
promotion of commerce, the government must remain mindful of its "other principal
responsibilities: to protect public safety and national security against the threats posed
by terrorists, organized crime, foreign intelligence agents, and others . . . . [WMe are
gravely concerned that the proliferation and use of unbreakable encryption would seri-
ously undermine out ability to protect the American people"), with Bernstein v. United
States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1438 (N.D. Ca. 1996) (finding that govern-
mental licensing schemes on encryption technology carry a heavy presumption against
validity when they act as a prior restraint on speech and noting that efforts at prior
restraint have been struck down in the face of national security concerns when those
concerns were too vague or lacking in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage). See
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (finding that the govern-
ment failed to meet its burden to impose a restraint on the publication of classified
military papers regarding the conflict in Vietnam).
6 The term "crypto" is commonly used in place of "cryptography" or "encryption"
and will be used at times herein as well.
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loosen or revise the impact of certain controls, which impact upon both
the computer industry and private citizens, present a significant interest
that cannot be wholly discounted. As a result, a compromise, principally
found in the form of an escrowed-encryption scheme, appears to be a
viable alternative to either extreme - that is, unmitigated decontrol of
strong encryption versus an absolute proscription of the export of strong
encryption. 7
IL CRYPTO 1018
There are two kinds of cryptography in this world: cryptography that
will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptography that
will stop major governments from reading you files.'9
- Bruce Scheier
[l]f I take a letter, lock it in a safe, hide the safe somewhere in New
York, then tell you to read the letter, that's not security. That's obscuri-
ty. On the other hand, if I take a letter and lock it in a safe, and then
give you the safe along with the design specifications of the safe and a
hundred identical safes with their combinations so that you and the
world's best safecrackers can study the locking mechanism - and you
still can't open the safe and read the letter - that's security.2
Bruce Schneier
A. What Is Cryptography?
Cryptography is the art and science of keeping information secret by
' Escrowed encryption involves numerous questions far beyond the scope of this
Note. However, when speaking about escrowed encryption as an alternative here, it is
important to note that the focus is entirely outward-that is, the export of encryption,
in an escrowed form. Although there is much debate whether mandatory escrow of
encryption for export in effect affects domestic encryption availability, that issue is not
considered here. Thus, for purposes of this Note, the author assumes controls on
exported encryption primarily will affect foreign users and that is, in fact, their primary
purpose.
1B This section serves as a short primer on crypto terms and concepts as well as
setting the stage for a fuller discussion of export control of encryption technology.
Cryptography is a highly complex art and science. With rapid advances in computer
technology, it has become even more complex and technical. This background section
is intended to provide only the most basic understanding of cryptography. See Charles
Merrill, A Cryptography Primer, 443 PLPAT 187 (1996), available in WESTLAW, for
an excellent overview of basic cryptography, specifically geared toward the attorney.
'9 SCHNEIER, supra note 7, at Preface, XIX.
2 Id.
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using a code2' or cipher.' Encryption is the process of transforming
original information into an unreadable or unintelligible form - gibber-
ish.' The original, unencrypted, information is referred to as plaintext.
The transformed, encrypted, information is called ciphertext.' Ciphertext
is returned to its original form, plaintext, by the process of decryption.
A mathematical function, essentially just a set of rules or series of
mathematical steps, is used for the process of encryption and decryption.
This is a cryptologic algorithm, sometimes referred to as a cipher
Most modem cryptographic systems utilize a "key" in conjunction with
the algorithm.' A cryptosystem consists of the algorithm, all possible
21 Codes and ciphers, although the terms are often used interchangeably, are not the
same. See DAvID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS xvi (2d. ed. 1996) [hereinafter
CODEBREAKERS] (distinguishing cryptographic code from cipher). A code is a
cryptosystem that deals with linguistic units, like words, phrases, and sentences. See
SCHNEE, supra note 7, at 1. A code is a system of concealing communication that
relies on pre-arranged mapping of meanings, often found in a "code book." See
CODEBREAKERS, at xvii. A good example of using a cryptographic code is Paul
Revere's "one, if by land, and two, if by sea." See Metaphor, supra note 1, at 713
(quoting HENRY W. LONGFELLOW, The Landlord's Tale: Paul Revere's Ride, in 4 THE
PohrcAL WORKS OF HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW 25, 25 (1966)). The basic unit
of a cipher, on the other hand, is the letter. See CODEBREAKERS, at xvi. Code-based
cryptosystems have limited applicability in computer-devised encryption schemes. See
SCHNEIER, supra note 7, at 31. As Bruce Schneier explains, "Codes are only useful for
specialized circumstances. Ciphers are useful for any circumstance. If your code has no
entry for anteaters, then you can't say it. You can say anything. with a cipher."
SCHNEMR, supra note 7, at 9. Modem encryption technology uses cryptographic algo-
rithms - ciphers. See id. at 2.
" See SCHNEIER, supra note 7, at 1. The word "cryptography" originates from the
Greek krypte<krypt6s, "secret, hidden," and graphia, "writing." See FRED B. WRIXON,
CODES AND CIPHERS 46 (1992). Since time immemorial, cryptography has been merely
"the science of keeping information secret from those not authorized to see it." CRISIS,
supra note 4, at 374. However, "[tioday, cryptographic methods help solve critical
information-age problems . . . ." Id. For example, cryptography now deals with
complex problems of data confidentiality, data integrity, and subject authentication. See
id.
' See Deborah Russell & G.T. Gangemi, Sr., Encryption, in COMPUTER SECURITY
BASICS 165, at 165-79 (1991), reprinted in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER 10, at 14
(Lance J. Hoffman ed., 1995).
24 Id.
2 Id.
6 Id.
See SCHNEIER, supra note 7, at 2.
See Russell & Gangemi, supra note 23, at 14. The cryptographic algorithm
"mathematically applies the key, which is usually a long string of numbers, to the
TOO MANY SECRETS
plaintexts and ciphertexts, along with the keys.29 "Cryptanalysis is the art
and science of decrypting ciphertext without access to the key," essential-
ly, "code breaking."
B. How Does It Work?
A particular encryption is typically achieved by taking plaintext,
which may be a stream of bits, a text file, a bitmap... or whatever, and
converting it to ciphertext by use of a key and an algorithm'
Decryption then works in the reverse, running the ciphertext back through
an algorithm-key combination resulting in the original plaintext.32 Gener-
ally, the strength of a cryptographic system is gauged by the length of its
key and the complexity of its algorithm 3
Modem cryptography is expressed by two general types of key-based
algorithms - the symmetric, also called single key or secret key, and the
asymmetric, also called public key.r In a secret-key system both the en-
cryption key and the decryption key are the same.' That is, everyone
that needs to decrypt the message must have the key distributed to
them.' Secret-key cryptographic schemes, however, possess an inherent
vulnerability - the problem of finding a trusted method to distribute the
key, and moreover, protecting the key while in custody.' Consequently,
informAtion being encrypted or decrypted." Id.
2 See SCHNEIER, supra note 7, at 4.
' Id. at 5. "Successful cryptanalysis may recover the plaintext or the key." Id.
Crypotology refers to the study of cryptography and cryptanalysis. See id. at 1. The
Department of Defense defines cryptology as the science which involves hidden, dis-
guised or encrypted communications, embracing both communications security and
communications intelligence. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE JoINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, DIcTIoNARY OF MlTARY AND AssocrATED TERMS 175 (1974).
"' See SCHNEERa, supra note 7, at 2.
12 See id.
33 See CRISIS, supra note 4, at 353.
See SCHNEIER, supra note 7, at 4.
3 See id. at 4-5.
See i.
See id. How well a key remains protected is a fundamental element concerning
the security of the encryption. See id. at 7 (describing how the best way to break a
cryptosystem is bribe, or steal, or blackmail your way to getting across the key). See
Ira S. Rubenstein, Export Controls on Encryption Software, in COPING WITH U.S.
EXPORT CONTROLS 1994, at 177, 183 (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Series No. A-705, 1994)
(noting that secret-key encryption requires a trusted method for distributing keys and
while possible in a military setting, "it is impractical in modem communications sys-
tems, where there is no secure channel for exchanging key secrets among millions of
potential users"); RSA Laboratories, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About
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symmetric, secret-key encryption was mostly impracticable for wide-
spread commercial or personal use."
The critical key-management problem facing secret-key cryptography
was solved in the mid-1970s, when two Stanford University scientists,
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman,39 invented public-key encryption.'
In public-key encryption, the key used for encryption is different from the
key used for decryption.4 Moreover, although the keys are mathemat-
ically related, as would be necessary to complete the encryp-
tion/decryption process, and essentially form a matched pair, it is
computationally infeasible to derive one key from the other. "Therefore,
the system allows users to openly publish one key in a phone-book like
directory (the 'public key'), while keeping the other key private (the 'pri-
vate key')." Public key encryption allows parties to exchange encrypted
messages by using and revealing only their public keys, without ever
having to exchange private keys.43
Cryptographic strength is dependent both upon the mathematical
structure of the algorithm itself and the length of the key used.' Gener-
ally, the longer the key, the stronger the encryption. This is particularly
Today's Cryptography, reprinted in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, 34 (Lance J. Hoffman
ed., 1995) ("The main problem is getting the sender and receiver to agree on the secret
key .... If they are in separate physical locations, they must trust a courier, or a
phone systems, or some other transmission system to not disclose the secret key being
communicated. Anyone who overhears or intercepts the key in transit can later read all
messages encrypted using that key").
' See also Rubenstein, supra note 37, at 183.
39 See id.
40 Id.
41 See ScHNEMR, supra note 7, at 4.
Rubenstein, supra note 37, at 183. A hypothetical might be helpful: A wants to
send B a confidential e-mail message. A looks up B's public key in a public-key
directory, probably found at some Internet site. A encrypts her e-mail message using
B's public key. A's encrypted message is then sent normally through the Internet. B
receives the message, which is in an unreadable form. B then decrypts A's e-mail
message using his own private key. Consequently, as long as B's private key remains
private, only he can read A's messages. The problems related to single key trusted
distribution are solved. See id. at 189.
43 See id.
See CRISIS, supra note 4, at 63.
See id. (describing how increasing the key size from 40 bits to 56 bits would
increase the time it takes to decipher the message (using a single computer) from 11.5
days to 2,000 years). For example, "[flor well-designed symmetric cryptographic sys-
tems, 'brute-force' exhaustive search - trying all possible keys with a given decryption
algorithm until the (meaningful) plaintext appears - is the best publicly known
cryptanalytic method." Id.
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the case when a "brute-force" attack is initiated to break the key.'
However, "[alithough key length is significant to the strength of an
algorithm, weaknesses in key management protocols or implementation
can allow keys to be cracked that would be impossible to determine by
brute-force."'47 The strength of a cryptographic algorithm is proportional
to the length of the key used - typically expressed in bits.'
C. What Is Escrowed Encryption?
Escrowed encryption is at its most basic level merely a tool - a
tool utilized to provide access to encrypted information, whether it be for
intelligence or law enforcement purposes or merely because the encryption
key was lost, forgotten or misplaced.49 "Escrowed encryption is the basis
for a number of administration proposals that seek to reconcile needs for
information security against the needs of law enforcement and to a lesser
extent national security."
' See id. A "brte-force" attack can be undertaken with a powerful computer or set
of computers that attempt every possible key combination until the actual key is found.
See id. at 124. For example, in 1995 a French student cracked a forty-bit key in eight
days using 120 workstations and several supercomputers. See Dorothy E. Denning &
William E. Baugh, Decoding Encryption Policy (visited Oct. 11, 1996) [hereinafter
Decoding Encryption] <http://www.SecurityManagement.com/library/OOO65.html
(10/11/96)>.
' See Encryption Policy, supra note 9. For example, two Berkeley students found
that the "keys generated for Netscape could be hacked in less than a minute because
they were not sufficiently random." Id.
See Planet Clipper, supra note 12, at 20.
See CRISIS, supra note 4, at 168.
Id. at 167. The "Clipper chip" was the government's initial attempt at presenting
a viable key escrow policy to the public. It was met with tremendous opposition. See
Richard L. Field, Survey of the Year's Developments in Electronic Cash Law and the
Laws Affecting Electronic Banking in the United States, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 993
(1997) (describing in detail the various efforts by the Clinton administration to produce
a viable key escrow system). The term "escrow" was introduced in the context of the
1993 Clipper initiative by the Clinton administration. At the outset "escrowed encryp-
tion" had a very specific meaning - a mechanism for assuring law enforcement access
to encrypted voice communication from wiretaps. However, during the several years of
ensuing debate over crypto, terms such as "escrow," "key escrow," or "escrowed
encryption" have engendered a much broader meaning, and in some cases different
meanings altogether. See CRISIS, supra note 4, at 168. "[Escrowed] is no longer the
very precise restricted concept embodied in the Clipper initiative . . . .Escrow as a
concept now applies not only to the initial purpose of assuring law enforcement access
to encrypted material, but also to possible end-user or organizational requirements for
a mechanism to protect against lost, corrupted, or unavailable keys." Id.
2971998]
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An escrowed encryption system is where either in part or in whole
a crypto key is kept "in escrow" by a trusted third party' The key
could be released only to authorized parties, either predetermined or by
court order.5 2 In essence, an escrowed encryption system enables a third
party to keep a copy of the encryption key needed to decrypt all commu-
nications using the escrowed standard.53 "These activities share the
premise that it is reasonable for the government to request, and in some
cases require, that private persons communicate in a manner that makes
interception by the government at least practical and preferably easy."
By virtue of holding or having access to a "back-door" key, the govern-
ment is willing to let stronger crypto out into the mainstream, or in other
words, allow the export of strong crypto.55  Since the Clinton
Administration's 1993 Clipper initiative, one of many different escrow
schemes proposed, some form of an escrowed encryption scheme has
"I See Dorothy E. Denning, The U.S. Key Escrow Encryption Technology, in
COMPUTER CoMM., July 1994, reprinted in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, Il1 (Lance J.
Hoffman ed., 1995) (describing the technical aspects of key escrow technology). "The
term 'escrow,' as used conventionally, implies that some item of value (e.g., a trust
deed, money, real property, other physical object) is delivered to an independent trusted
party that might be a person or an organization (i.e., an escrow agent) for safekeeping,
and is accompanied by a set of rules provided by the parties involved in the transac-
tion governing the actions of the escrow agent." CRISIS, supra note 4, at 167.
32 See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL MAKES KEY ESCROW ANNOUNCEMENTS (1994), reprinted in BUILDING IN BIG
BROTHER, 241 (Lance J. Hoffman ed., 1995) (outlining the basic methodology of key
escrow). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES FOR RE-
LEASE OF ENCRYPTION KEY COMPONENTS IN CONJuNCrION WITH INTERCEPTS PURSUANT
To TITLE I AND FISA (1994), reprinted in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, 243 (Lance
J. Hoffman ed., 1995) (outlining the procedure by which the department may release
escrowed key components that use key-escrow encryption methods, as proposed Feb. 4,
1994).
"' See CRISIS, supra note 4, at 167 ("The underlying notion is that the escrow
agent is a secure haven for temporary ownership or possession of the item, is legally
bound to comply with the set of rules for its disposition, functions as a disinterested
extratransaction party, and bears legal liability for malfeasance or mistakes"). See also
Metaphor, supra note 1, at 742-43.
5 See Metaphor, supra note 1, at 743.
5 See Encryption Export: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of William A. Reinsch,
Under Secretary for Export Administration) [hereinafter Encryption Export]. See
generally Prepared Testimony of William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary for Export
Administration on Encryption Policy Before the House Committee on International
Relations, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, 105th Cong.
(1997) [hereinafter Reinsch Testimony].
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served to form the basis for encryption control. 6 The government has
generally seen escrowed encryption as a viable alternative to what would
otherwise seem to be a zero-sum situation.' Escrow became a com-
promise between the needs of the U.S. national security establishment and
the concerns of individuals and businesses." However, opponents to any
controls on encryption technology have generally regarded escrowed
encryption proposals as yet another attempt to back-door, Big-Brother into
purely "private" matters5 9
D. Historical Perspective
Cryptography has a very long and very rich history.' The earliest
traces of cryptography date back nearly 3,000 years to early Egyptian
hieroglyphic symbol substitutions." "From the Spartans to Julius Caesar,
from the Old Testament ciphers to the Papal plotters of the Fourteenth
Century, from Mary, Queen of Scots to Abraham Lincoln's Civil War
ciphers, cryptography has been part of war, diplomacy, and politics." 2
For example, Gaius Julius Caesar is accredited with successfully using
Greek letters to mask his Latin communiqu6s. Caesar also used rearrange-
ments of plaintext alphabet, with only the intended recipient knowing how
to shift the alphabet back to a readable form.' The American Revolution
See CRISIS, supra note 4, at 215, 414-20.
See Encryption Export, supra note 55. See generally Reinsch Testimony, supra
note 55.
S See Encryption Export, supra note 55. The debate over export controls is closely
linked to the debate over escrowed encryption, as proposals by the Clinton administra-
tion for relaxation of export controls are almost entirely predicated on adoption of some
variant of an escrowed key regime. Opponents of crypto export controls argue that the
national security argument is largely a red herring, and that the actual motive behind
preservation of export controls on encryption is to provide leverage for imposing an
unwanted escrowed encryption standard on the public. See generally The Promotion of
Commerce Online in the Digital Era Act of 1996, or Pro-CODE Act: Hearings on S.
1726 before the Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 104th Cong. (1996)
[hereinafter Pro-CODE Hearings].
'9 See ANDRE BACARD, THE COMPUTER PRrVACY HANDBOOK 100 (1995).
See generally CODEBREAKERS, supra note 21 (comprehensively sketching the
history of cryptography from ancient Egypt to India, Mesopotamia, Babylon, Greece,
and further into Western civilization, and finally dawning at the technology-laden
modem era). Kahn's book, originally published in 1967, but recently revised and
updated, remains to this day the most definitive work on the history of cryptography.
61 See CODEBREAKERS, supra note 21, at 71-73.
6 Russell & Gangemi, supra note 23, at 11.
' This came to be know as the "Caesar Substitution." See WRIXON supra note 22,
at 29, 34; see also Luke Seemann, Keys to Secret Drawers, (Sept. 29, 1996)
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has a very rich history regarding organized cryptography and
cryptanalysis. During the American Revolution, Benedict Arnold, while
arranging his betrayal of West Point to the British, passed clandestine
correspondence to John Andre by employing a book code based on
volume I of the fifth Oxford edition of Blackstone's famed legal classic,
Commentaries on the Laws of England.'
However, colonial efforts and advancements in crypto paled in
comparison to those made during World War I. Cryptography played a
very substantial role in World War II. "The development of modem
cryptography owes much to the research conducted under the pressures of
World War II, and particularly to the breaking of the Engimae ma-
chine." The cracking of the German "Ultra" codes and the Japanese
"Purple" codes on the other side of the ocean contributed substantially to
the allied victory in World War HI.' "In the decades since World War
II, the use of computers to break codes has transformed the code breaking
game and has contributed greatly to the use of cryptography in military
and intelligence applications, as well as in systems used in everyday
computer systems."69
<www.stardot.coml-ukeseem/j202/essay.html> ('The earliest systems of encryption were
the so-called 'Caesar Ciphers' used by early generals to send secret messages. They
used the simplest of algorithms. Each letter was replaced by another letter a certain
distance away in the alphabet. 'A' would become 'E' and 'B' would become 'F,' for
example. Today, however, the science of cryptology is an advanced form of mathemat-
ics filled with esoteric jargon such as 'graph isomorphism,' 'multiplexers,' and 'one-way
hash functions').
6 See generally CARL VAN DOREN, SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION (1941) (discussing the use of code during numerous Revolutionary War intrigues).
See also CODEBREAKERS, supra note 21, at 176-84.
's See CODEBREAKERS, supra note 21, at 176-77. Arnold and Andre's code used
three numbers to make a word. To encode plaintext, they would search for necessary
words for the message in a book, then, when a word was found, its page number, line
number, and word number were written down. The first number represented the page,
the second the line, and the third the word. "Words not in the book were to be
spelled out, and these codenumbers distinguished from the others by drawing a line
through the last number, which then represented the position of a letter in that line in-
stead of a word." It was considered unbreakable but ultimately discarded as being
impractical and highly cumbersome. Id. at 177.
" The Enigma was a cipher machine invented by Arthur Scherbius early in the
20th century and used by the German Navy and foreign office as early as 1926. See
Russell & Gangemi, supra note 23, at 12; WRIXON, supra note 22, at 60.
' See Russell & Gangemi, supra note 23, at 12; DAVID KAHN, SEIZING THE
ENIGMA (1991) (providing a full account of the breaking of the Enigma code and an
interesting discussion of the Enigma machine).
68 See CODEBREAKERS, supra note 21, at 67, 613.
' Russell & Gangemi, supra note 23, at 14.
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IR. CONTROLS ON PROLIFERATION OF STRONG CRYPTO7°
As far as the Department of Defense is concerned, cryptography and
nuclear technology are two of the most sensitive areas in science and
research since they both represent military strength.7! '
- Winn Schwartau
Cryptographic software is not barred from export from the United States,
but is controlled through a licensing process.
_ Junger v. Christopher
Generally, there is no control regime in place to control the prolifer-
ation of encryption technology purely within the United States. 3 Howev-
er, even that issue is highly contested, as those supporting relaxation of
current export controls on cryptography claim that controls on export
implicitly restrict domestic use.74 The government has often and loudly
stated that it does not seek to control domestic use of cryptography.
However, as with almost every other issue in this highly charged debate,
opponents dismiss those assertions as merely Big Brother-esque lip ser-
Encryption with a key length longer than 40-bits is generally considered to be
strong encryption. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Although the government
in practice and substantially in effect controls all encryption, this Note is concerned
with controls and challenges as they relate to further proliferation of strong encryption.
This, no doubt, is a difficult distinction to make given the all-encompassing and
overlapping nature of the crypto control policy, challenges thereto, and the subject
matter itself; however, it is a necessary distinction to make if the national security
perspective is to be fully appreciated. While proliferation of any encryption (i.e., weak
or strong) ipso facto presents a threat (of some kind) to national security, on balance,
the stronger the crypto, the stronger the threat. As a result, suggestions for further
control of strong encryption do not necessarily lend themselves to support of control
of all encryption, weak or strong. As noted supra the strength of the encryption,
measured by key length, is generally representative of its ability to repel attack or lend
itself to cryptanalysis. However, this is by no means the only factor that affects the
fundamental "security" of encryption. See Encryption Policy, supra note 9 (noting that
poor management or implementation can weaken otherwise secure encryption).
7' WINN SCHWARTAU, INFORMATION WARFARE 148 (1994).
' Junger v. Christopher, No. 96 CV 1723, at 21 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 1997)
(defendant's proposed findings and facts and conclusion of law).
" See Showdown on Encryption, WASH. POST, May 25, 1997, at C6.
4 See id. (noting that opponents of controls claim that it is too complicated to
market full strength encryption for domestic use and a weaker encryption for foreign
use).
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vice.' But the fact remains that no explicit controls exist on cryptogra-
phy domestically.76
A. Prior Control of Encryption Under ITAR
United States policy concerning control of strong encryption was
significantly altered at the end of 1996. As a result, prior to outlining the
current controls on the availability of strong encryption, there will be a
brief review of the previous control regime. This review of prior policy
will provide the necessary context for discussion of the current control
regime.
Prior to December of 1996, the distribution of encryption products
outside of the United States was governed by the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(1TAR).78 ITAR control items are listed on the U.S. Munitions List
(USML) and administered by the Office of Defense Trade Controls,
Department of State.79 The Commerce Department administers the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR). EAR regulate the export of "dual-
use"' items, which are listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL).8"
Items listed on the CCL typically include data authentication and pass-
word protection encryption devices.' Generally, items "capable of
75 Id.
76 Id.
See 22 U.S.C. 2778 (1994).
See 22 C.F.R. § 120 (1997). The statutory authority for ITAR rests in the Arms
Export Control Act, as amended at 22 U.S.C 2778 (1994).
See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 XII(b)(1) (1997) (specifically including on the U.S.
Munitions List as defense articles: "Cryptographic (including key management) systems,
equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, components or software with the
capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality or information or information sys-
tems . . .").
so Items that possess a potential for use in both a commercial and military market.
, The EARs promulgate the policies set forth by the Export Administration Act of
1979. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1994), which lapsed on August 20, 1994; see also
15 C.F.R. § 768 (1997). Nonetheless, President Clinton issued an executive order
requiring that the EAR be kept in force to 'the extent permitted by law' under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988
& Supp IV 1992). See Continuation of Export Control Regulations, Exec. Order No.
12924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43437 (1994). President Clinton recently extended the state of
emergency required to activate his authority under IEEPA. See Continuation of
Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 42527 (1996); Planet
Clipper, supra note 12, at 21 n.20.
'2 See JAMES CHANDLER ET AL., REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF U.S. LAWS, REG LA-
TIONS, AND CASE LAWS PERTAINING TO THE USE OF COMMERCIAL ENCRYPTION
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encrypting a message are listed on the USML unless the product is
restricted to financial uses such as ATMs."'
The AECA authorizes the President to control the export of defense
articles by designating such items on the USML.? While products gov-
erned by the EAR can be exported under a general license, encryption
products falling under ITAR need a separate license application and
review which ordinarily involves a referral to the Defense Department and
the National Security Agency.' More specifically, "[o]nce on the USML,
and unless otherwise exempted, a defense article or service requires a
license before it can be imported or exported."' However, encryption
products with key-lengths of more than 40-bits were generally not export-
able." It is not altogether clear why the level was set at 40-bits; howev-
PRoDUCrs FOR VOICE AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS, (1994) reprinted in BUIING IN
BIG BROTHER 435, at 443 (Lance J. Hoffman ed., 1995) (Also included on the CCL
are those cryptographic items involving message authentication, access control devices,
television descramblers, automatic teller machines, virus protection, and "smart cards").
See Planet Clipper, supra note 12, at 21.
See 22 U.S.C. § 2778; see also 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (United States Munitions
List).
' Planet Clipper, supra note 12, at 21. See also Stewart Baker, Government Regu-
lation of Encryption Technology: Frequently Asked Questions, 452 PLI/Pat 287, 293
(Sept. 1996) [hereinafter Baker FAQ]. See Rubenstein, supra note 37, at 198 (noting
that one of the stages of the approval process for encryption software is NSA Review).
Rubenstein goes on to note that g "rule of thumb for encryption exporters is to . ..
develop a good working relationship with the NSA." 1d. NSA, in effect, is the only
government agency with the technical expertise for evaluating whether cryptographic
products fall within one category or another. Id.
' Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F.Supp. 1426, 1429 (N.D. Cal.
1996). "'The ITAR is administered primarily within the Department of State by the
Director of the Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC), Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs." The ITAR allows for a 'commodity jurisdiction procedure' by which the
ODTC determines if an article or service is covered by the USML when doubt exists
about an item." 22 C.F.R. 120.4(a). Categories of items covered by the USML are enu-
merated at section 121.1 Category XIII, Auxiliary Military Equipment, includes
"[Ciryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies, modules,
integrated circuits, components or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy
or confidentiality of information or information systems . . . ." 22 C.F.R § 121.1
XIII(b)(1) (1997). A number of applications of cryptography are excluded, such as those
used in automated teller machines and certain mass-marketed software products that use
encryption. Id. See also 22 U.S.C. 2778(b)(2).
7 See Planet Clipper, supra note 12, at 22-23 (citing U.S. Department of Com-
merce and National Security Agency, A Study of the International Market for Computer
Software With Encryption 11-2 (1996). See also Baker FAQ, supra note 85, at 293
(noting that "the State Department routinely allows the export of cryptographic software
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er, "[m]ost likely, it was the result of a set of compromises that were
politically driven by all of the parties involved.""8
Several regulations and statutes collectively authorized control of all
cryptographic products and were administered by the Department of State
and the Department of Commerce. 9 ITAR is a very restrictive export
control regulation applying only to those items that the government
considers most threatening to U.S. security interests.' The mere fact that
cryptographic products were placed within ITAR's jurisdiction speaks vol-
umes about the government's perception of the potential security risk that
export of crypto presents. Controls on crypto products are designed to
have a limiting effect on the further global proliferation of strong encr3p-
lion.9 Moreover, there can be little doubt that the ultimate goal of
controls on crypto products is to "keep strong cryptography out of the
hands of potential targets of signals intelligence." The controls limit to
a great extent the basic availability of encryption software of strategic and
that use algorithm with a key length of 40 bits or less, provided that stronger encryp-
tion cannot be easily substituted or installed").
CRISIS, supra note 4, at 122.
' Export controls were even more onerous during the Cold War. During the Cold
War, the United States was a member of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls (COCOM), which coordinated export regulations among the various
members in an effort to prevent sensitive technologies from finding their way to the
Eastern Bloc. "Under COCOM, any member could effectively veto the decision of
another member to re-export a sensitive technology of product." However, with the fall
of Russia and the Eastern Bloc, COCOM's purpose also disappeared, and it was
formally dissolved in March, 1994. Sean M. Flynn, A Puzzle Even The Codebreakers
Have Trouble Solving: A Clash of Interests Over The Electronic Encryption Standard,
27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 217, 225-26 (1995).
9 See generally Peter D. Trooboff, A Brief ITAR Primer in the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR), in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CoNTROLS 1996, at 219-36
(PLI Comm. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, 1996) (discussing how ITAR
differs from other export control regimes and how exporters can comply with it).
9' See ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, INC., CODES, KEYS AND CON-
FLICTS: IssuEs IN U.S. CRYPTO POLICY 25 (June 1994) [hereinafter ACM] ("The goals
of U.S. export control policy in the area of cryptography are (i) to limit foreign
availability of cryptographic systems of strategic capability, namely, those capable of
resisting concerted cryptanalytic attack; (ii) to limit foreign availability of cryptographic
systems of sufficient strength to present a serious barrier to traffic selection or the
development of standards that interfere with traffic selection by making the messages
in broad classes of traffic (fax, for example) difficult to distinguish; and (ii) to use the
export-control process as a mechanism for keeping track of commercially produced
cryptosystems, whether U.S. or foreign, that NSA may at some time by called upon to
break").
' CRISIS, supra note 4, at 128.
304 [Vol. 30:287
1998] TOO MANY SECRETS 305
in many cases non-strategic value.' Additionally, export controls allow
the National Security Agency (NSA)" to assess the quality of commer-
cially available software.' But most importantly, export controls limit
the availability of encryption products that could hinder efforts by NSA
or various law enforcement agencies to obtain intelligence information.'
B. Current Control of Encryption Under EAR
In 1993, beginning with the Clipper chip initiative,' the Clinton
' See Charles L. Evans, U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software: Efforts to
Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to Compete in
Foreign Markets, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 469, 488 (1994). See also CRISIS,
supra note 4, at 127-34. Of course, regardless of which side one takes in the debate
over whether these controls are in fact effective, it is a truism that any restrictions will
limit availability to one extent or another. Consequently, the question then becomes one
of relative impact effectiveness. See id. at 127-28.
" The National Security Agency, an intelligence agency generally considered more
secret than the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is charged with both keeping our
secrets and breaking theirs. See JAMES BAMFORD, THE PumZzE PALACE (1982). The
National Security Agency (NSA) is America's largest intelligence agency. The National
Security Agency was established on October 24, 1952, by a top secret seven-page
presidential memorandum signed by then-President Harry S. Truman. The Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA), on the other hand, was established by public law, the National
Security Act of 1947 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1994)). The
Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense is responsible for directing, operating, and
controlling the National Security Agency. See Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed Reg.
59,941, 59,947 (1981). NSA is responsible for the "[e]stablishment and operation of an
effective unified organization for signals intelligence activities . . . ." Id. at 59,947.
NSA is charged with collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence
information for national foreign intelligence purposes. See i& Additionally, NSA is
responsible for the "[c]onduct of research and development to meet the needs of the
United States for signals intelligence and communications security." Id. In short, NSA
has a simple yet immense job - "to eavesdrop on the entire world, picking up all elec-
tronic transmissions, no matter how faint or what point of origin, then to plow through
this pile of chaff to find the kernels of intelligence... ." ERNEST VOLKMANN &
BLAIR BAGGET, SECRET INTELLGENCE 178 (1989).
" See BAMFORD, supra note 94.
96 Id.
' See CRISIS, supra note 4, at 170-74. "Mhe Clipper initiative was conceived as
a way for providing legal access by law enforcement authorities to encrypted telephony.
The Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), a Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS-185), was promulgated in February 1994 as the key technological component of
the Clipper initiative . . . . Specifically, the EES called for the integration of special
microelectronic integrated circuit chips (called "Clipper chips") into devices used for
voice communications; these chips, as one part of an overall system, provide voice
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Administration started down a long road of crypto controversy.98 The
essence of the Administration's encryption policy is predicated on the
concept of "escrowed" encryption." The Administration's crypto policy
evolved through a number of incarnations."® However, current policy
can trace its roots to Vice President Gore's statement of the
Administration's policy on October 1, 1996.201 This somewhat revised
confidentiality for the user and exceptional access to law enforcement authorities." Id.
at 170-71. See also Dorothy E. Denning & Miles Smid, Key Escrowing Today, IEEE
COMM. MAG., Sept. 1994, at 58, 58.
9 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
9 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for an explanation of escrowed en-
cryption.
'0 See Metaphor, supra note 1, at 752-811 (outlining the evolution and details of
various Clipper initiatives and escrowed encryption).
10 The Clinton Administration's overall policy concerning the proliferation of strong
encryption no doubt can be traced quite beyond Gore's Oct. 1 statement; however, the
current incarnation of crypto policy really finds its basic form in the statement of the
administrations objectives and concerns by Gore. Consequently, the succinct statement
of policy by Vice President Gore is excerpted below.
President Clinton and I are committed to promoting the growth of electronic commerce
and robust, secure communications worldwide while protecting the public safety and
national security. To that end, this Administration is consulting with Congress, the
information technology industry, state and local law enforcement officials, and foreign
governments on a major initiative to liberalize export controls for commercial encryption
products ....
Under this initiative, the export of 56-bit key length encryption products will be
permitted under a general license after one-time review, and contingent upon industry
commitments to build and market future products that support key recovery. This policy
will apply to hardware and software products. The relaxation of controls will last up to
two years ....
The Administration's initiative recognizes that an industry-led technology strategy will
expedite market acceptance of key recovery, and that the ultimate solution must be
market-driven ....
No key length limits or algorithm restrictions will apply to exported key recovery
products.
Domestic use of key recovery will be voluntary, and any American will remain free to
use any encryption system domestically.
The temporary relaxation of controls is one part of a broader encryption policy initiative
designed to promote electronic information security and public safety .... The Ad-
ministration also will seek legislation to facilitate commercial key recovery, including
providing penalties for improper release of keys, and protecting key recovery agents
against liability when they properly release a key ....
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Clipper EI policy proposed the "development of federal standards for key
recovery, adoption of key recovery systems within the federal govern-
ment, and liberalization of export controls for products that provide key
recovery.
''1re
[The administration's] policy is designed to provide better encryption to
individuals and businesses while ensuring that the needs of law enforce-
ment and national security are met. Encryption is a law and order issue
since it can be used by criminals to thwart wiretaps and avoid detection
and prosecution. It also has huge strategic value. Encryption technology
and cryptanalysis turned the tide in the pacific and elsewhere during
World War 11. 3
Key recovery. is, however, essentially about resolving a fundamental di-
lemma of encryption - that is, allowing the use of robust algoritlms
with long keys, while at the same time providing for code brealing under
controlled conditions, for instance, by government officials with a court
order.1
4
On December 30, 1996, the Clinton Administration implemented new
regulations governing encryption.1"s These new measures include re-
laxing export controls for certain commercial encryption products, devel-
oping, in cooperation with industry, performance standards for a Key
Two years from now, the export of 56-bit products that do not support key recovery
will no longer be permitted. Currently exportable 40-bit mass market software products
will continue to be exportable. We will continue to support financial institutions in their
efforts to assure the recovery of encrypted financial information. Longer key lengths will
continue to be approved for products dedicated to the support of financial applications
The Administration's initiative is broadly consistent with the recent recommendations of
the National Research Council. It also addresses many of the objectives of pending Con-
gressional legislation.
The White House, Office of The Vice President, Statement Of The Vice President Oct.
1, 1996 (statement by Vice President Gore on major initiative to liberalize export
controls for commercial encryption and promote key escrow).
" See Encryption Policy, supra note 9.
113 THE WAT HousE, OFICE OF To E VICE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF THE VICE
PRsDErr (Feb. 4, 1994), reprinted in BuING IN BIG BROTHER 235, at 235 (Lance
J. Hoffman ed., 1995).
14 Id.
oS 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-774 (1997); Amendment to the International Traffic In Arms
Regulations, 22 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1997). See also Felice Kaden Laird, Sunmy Of
Regulations Transferring Jurisdiction Over Commercial Encryption Products From State
To Commerce, THE EXPORT PRACTrTONER, 1/15/97 Export Prac. 4, available in 1997
WL 8530599. See Rubenstein, supra note 37, at 186-203 (providing comprehensive
review of export controls on encryption products).
1998]
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Recovery System, transferring export control jurisdiction of encryption
from State to Commerce, and allowing a "trusted third party" hold the
escrowed keys."° If companies agree to begin formulating a key-recov-
ery system, they will be allowed to export non-recovery 56-bit key length
strong encryption for up to two years." In effect, the government will
now allow companies to export stronger encryption products, "provided
they have a plan to store 'spare keys' for unlocking encrypted informa-
tion with a government-approved third party."'0 8 Additionally, encryption
was transferred from the USML to the CCL of the EAR"° .
IV. CHALLENGES TO THE CONTROL REGIME
The Administration needs to work with Congress to develop a consensus
on a national encryption policy that takes account of the privacy, law
enforcement and competitiveness concerns of out Nation's citizens and
businesses." °
- Senator Patrick Leahy
The crypto export control regime, long considered a national security
given, is under attack, both in court and Congress. Attacks on crypto
controls have come on two fronts, constitutional court challenges and
legislative proposals in Congress.
The United States Congress has a number of bills before it with the
goal of relaxing controls on the export of encryption."' There have
been at least three significant cases presenting constitutional challenges to
encryption licensing controls."' While congressional efforts appear to be
motivated mostly by financial or international trade concerns, court
' See Laird, supra note 105.
,07 See IJ. Prior, Controls on Cryptography Boil Down to Old Fashioned Politics,
4/15/97 EXPORT PRAC. 6 (1997) available in 1997 WL 8530637.
"01 See Elizabeth Corcoran, House Committee Approves Bill to Relax Curbs on
Encryption, WASH. POST, May 15, 1997, at E01. As of May 1997, 24 companies had
applied for permission to export stronger encryption pursuant to the new regulations.
About half the applications were approved. See id.
109 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-774 (1/7/97, supersedes 1/4/97). The interim rule amending
EAR was published on December 30, 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 68572-68587 (1996).
ITAR was amended at 61 Fed. Reg. 68633 (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. 121).
"o See Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) On The Administration's New
Encryption Initiative, (poted on Oct. 1, 1996) (visited Mar. 12, 1998) <http://www.cdt.
org/crypto/clipper3l1/961001_Leahy-stnnt.hunl> (urging Congress to address shortcom-
ings of the Clinton Administration's plan for a national encryption policy).
. See Showdown on Encryption, supra note 73.
1' See Fields, supra note 50, at 996-98.
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challenges find their predicate on constitutional grounds. However, both
seek the dismantling of the current control regime. Whether challenges are
constitutional or congressional, national security is the government's
primary response and, moreover, the crucial element of the equation.
Export controls have been gradually loosened since 1983.113 The ques-
tion now is just how much further this relaxation can proceed without
damaging national security.
A. Congressional Challenges to Crypto Licensing Controls
In the 105th Congress, legislation challenging the government's
control of encryption technology has been introduced in both the House
of Representatives and Senate."' Most of these proposals seek to take
encryption issues out of political and national security spheres of influ-
ence and place them firmly within the commercial arena."'
Senator Conrad Bums (R-MT) has reintroduced legislation to elimi-
nate export control of encryption technology." 6 Pro-CODE or "The
Promotion of Commerce On-line in the Digital Era Act," generally allows
for the unrestricted export of encryption products." 7 The bill requires
allowing the export of encryption technologies if products of a similar
strength are available elsewhere in the world and prohibits imposition of
a mandatory key-escrow program."' The bill also prohibits the Coin-
"' See CRISIS, supra note 4, at 166.
"14 See Prior, supra note 107. However, most of the current legislative action
originated during the 104th Congress, where a number of bills dealing with encryption
technology were first introduced. See generally Pro-CODE Hearings, supra note 58
(transcribing Senate Committee Hearings on the Pm-CODE Act); S. 1726, 104th Cong.
(1996) ("Promotion Of Commerce On-Line In The Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act Of
1996"); H.R. 3011, 104th Cong. (1996) ("Security And Freedom Through Encryption
(SAFE) Act"). However, none of these bills made it to the Senate or House floor for
a vote before the end of the session. See Encryption Policy, supra note 9. Many of the
bills currently before the 105th Congress are reintroductions of bills from the 104th
Congress. Id.
"s See Prior, supra note 107.
j6 See S. 377, 105th Cong. (1997). It is virtually identical to Bum's previous
attempt to ban all export regulations relating to cryptography, S. 1726, 104th Cong. §
5(c) (1996). See Bums, Burns Introduces Internet-Friendly Bill: "Pro-CODE" To Give
Computer, Cell Phone Users Privacy, Security (made available Feb. 27, 1997)
<www.senate.gov/-burnslp-feb27.htm> [hereinafter Internet-Friendly Bill]. Senator Bums
is the chairman of the Commerce Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space.
,S 5. 377, 105th Cong. (1997).
"m Id. For a summary of the specifics of the bill, see also Bill Sunmary and Status
Information, Digest, S 377 (visited Mar. 12, 1998) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibinl
dquerylO5.html#blno>.
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merce Department from imposing any encryption standards on the private
sector." 9 There can be little mistake as to the intent of the bill. Senator
Leahy (D-VT), a co-sponsor of Pro-CODE as well as sponsor of his own
encryption legislation, states, "These bills ... roll back current restric-
tions on the export of strong cryptography so that high-tech U.S. firms
are free to compete in the global marketplace and meet the demands of
customers - both foreign and domestic - for strong encryption."''
Pro-CODE is being paraded as promoting "electronic commerce
through the use of strong encryption,'' but the question that must be
asked is, at what expense and for what reason? Senator Bums believes
that "online commerce will never reach its full potential under the poli-
cies of the [Clinton administration]."'t " Senator Bums sees the problem
of encryption proliferation not in security terms, but strictly in dollar
terms."z The Clinton administration opposes Bums' bill because "it does
not balance the needs of individual privacy and economic growth with
national security and public safety."''
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Encrypted Communications
Privacy Act of 1997 on the same day that Senator Bums introduced his
Pro-CODE bill.12 Senator Leahy's bill generally mirrors Senator Bums'
attack on crypto export controls, but also seeks protection of any U.S.
person using encryption, regardless of strength, in any State or foreign
country." The bill also criminalizes the use of encryption when used
in furtherance of a crime."
Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) introduced the Security and
Freedom Through Encryption Act (SAFE).m SAFE relaxes crypto ex-
port controls on encryption products deemed generally available interna-
119 See S. 377.
t2O Encryption Bills Make Their Way Back to Capitol Hill, COMMUNICATIONS TODAY,
Feb. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7465590.
221 See S. 377.
222 Internet-Friendly Bill, supra note 116.
222 See id. ("Burns and supporters have pointed to a study that estimates a loss of
$60 billion and more than 200,000 jobs to foreign competitors under current restric-
tions").
224 Bill Pietrucha, Burns, Leahy Introduce Encryption Export Legislation, Newsbytes,
(visited Nov. 3, 1997) <wysiwygiHl3http://www.nbnn.com/nbcgibin.udtshow.NB.
NEW?ID=86898> (quoting Undersecretary of Commerce William Reinsch).
'- S. 376, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced, Feb. 27, 1997).
126 See id. (proposing the enactment of § 2805 for the protection of U.S. nationals
using encryption).
" See id. (outlawing both the use of encryption to obstruct justice and the unautho-
rized release of decryption keys).
" H.R. 695, 105th Cong. (1997).
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tionally and prohibits the implementation of a mandatory key escrow re-
gime. The bill provides the right to freely use any strength encryption
product. And like the Pro-CODE bill, it creates new criminal penalties for
using crypto in furtherance of a crime.
However, Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Bob Kerrey (D-NE)
have introduced legislation which amounts to a different sort of "chal-
lenge" to the control of crypto technology."9 The Secure Public Net-
works Act of 1997 "is quite broad, including many provisions from a
draft administration bill that was informally circulated, as well as some
provisions from the Pro-CODE and SAFE bills."'' The Secure Public
Networks Act generally codifies the Clinton administrations current regu-
lations governing export of encryption technology' but makes some
effort towards relaxation of the controls by allowing a list of factors to
be considered in evaluating applications for export licenses for strong en-
cryption products not based on a key recovery system." Kerrey's bill
also establishes stiff penalties for use of crypto in furtherance of a crime,
and provides incentives for domestic use of key-recovery or key-escrow
systems.' Additionally, unlike other legislative efforts to decontrol
crypto, Kerrey's bill contains a presidential power provision - whereby
the president "may waive provisions of this act with a finding of danger
to national security, public safety, economic security, or public inter-
est."
134
It is difficult to predict how any of these legislative proposals might
fare in the coming months. There is some support for the SAFE and Pro-
CODE bills, but it is unlikely that either one has enough support for
passage at present, let alone enough to overcome a very predictable
presidential veto. The Secure Public Networks Act is ostensibly an
attempt at a compromise solution. However, it has not garnered much
support at all from either the Pro-CODE or SAFE camps. Consequently,
at least for the near term, export control of crypto is unlikely to fall at
the hands of Congress.
It is difficult to predict how ant of these legislative proposals might
fare in the coming months. There is some support for the SAFE and Pro-
"' See Net Tangle on Privacy, WASH. POST, June 22, 1997 at C6 (Many would not
consider the legislation a challenge at all, but rather an attempt to shore up recently
relaxed controls.).
'30 Stewart Baker & Michael D. Hintze, Government Regulation of Encryption, 760
PL/Comm 445, 453 (1997). See also S. 909, 105th Cong. (1997).
"3 See id. (allowing export of 56-bit crypto after one time review; export of
stronger crypto if based on qualified system of key recovery).
132 Id.
" See id.
'34 Id.
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CODE bills, but it is unlikely that wither one has enough support for
passage at present, let alone enough to overcome a very predictable
presidential veto. The "Secure Public Networks Act" is ostensibly an
attempt at a compromise solution; however, it has not garnered much
support at all from either the Pro-CODE or SAFE camps. Consequently,
at least for the near term, export control of crypto is unlikely to fall at
the hands of Congress.
B. Constitutional Challenges to Crypto Licensing Controls
The U.S. Department of State, until most recently, was the primary
gatekeeper for security export controls on crypto. Consequently, the State
Department has received the full legal wrath of our modem-day crypto
knights - those individuals so seemingly disenchanted with the apparent-
ly Orwellian-esque system that dares to challenge their "right" to be
unheard. 3' In short, crypto security controls have been subject to a
number of lawsuits in the past several years. These lawsuits have sought
to challenge the underlying validity of the security export controls. Not so
surprisingly, the primary weapon of choice for these crypto knights has
been the First Amendment.
1. Karn v. United States Department of State"
,35 See Phillip E. Reiman, Cryptography and the First Amendment: The Right to Be
Unheard, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 325, 326-27, 334-37, 339-41
(1996) (arguing for analysis of cryptography as "undeniably a form of speech" and "not
simply an extension of existing free speech concepts, but a new dimension of our
constitutional rights").
'36 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996). Of note, on January 21, 1997, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled on Kam's appeal of the district court decision. The appellate
court remanded his case back to district court. The Court of Appeals chose to remand
the case for reconsideration in light of the recent shift in crypto regulations from
control by the State Department to the Commerce Department. Judge Richey, who
originally considered and ruled against Karn, will consider the case most likely some
time this spring. See Karn v. Department of State, No. 96-5121, 1997 WL 71750, at
**I (D.C. Cir.) ("In light of the recent Executive Order transferring regulatory authority
of non-military cryptographic computer source code to the Commerce Department, and
the Commerce Department's promulgation of a new regulation under the authority of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq., we
remand this case to the district court to consider the reviewability of and, if ap-
propriate, the merits of appellant's claim under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Because "basic tenets of judicial restraint and separation of powers call upon [the
court] first to consider alternative grounds for resolution" when the court is asked to
answer a question involving the Constitution of the United States (Lamprecht v. FCC,
958 F.2d 382, 389-90 (D.C. Cir. 1992)), we do not reach the constitutional issues
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Phillip Karn filed suit against the government because the State
Department would not allow him permission to export a floppy disk
which contained a number of strong cryptographic schemes. 37 The State
Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls ruled that the disk was
subject to ITAR control and denied its export.' After being denied on
appeal, Kam filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia challenging the designation of the computer disk containing
crypto as a "defense article."'3 Judge Charles R. Richey issued summa-
ry judgment for the government. The court held that designation of the
diskette containing the cryptographic source codes as a "defense article"
was not subject to judicial review; 4 export regulations did not violate
Karn's free speech rights, and export limitations did not violate due pro-
cess. '4 In fact, Judge Richey in his opinion wrote at some length re-
garding his impression of the "merits" of Karn:
This case presents a classic example of how the courts today, particular-
ly the federal courts, can become needlessly invoked, whether in the
national interest or not, in litigation involving policy decisions made
within the power of the President or another branch of the government.
The plaintiff, in an effort to export a computer diskette for profit, raises
administrative law and meritless constitutional claims because he and
others have not been able to persuade the Congress and the executive
Branch that technology at issue does not endanger the national security.
This is a "political question" for the two elected branches under Articles
I and II of the Constitution."
There can be little doubt that Judge Richey took what could only be
raised by this appeal").
'1 Kam v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1996).
Id. at 3.
'I Id. at 4.
"' See id. at 9-14 (explaining that the ITAR was content neutral and narrowly
tailored to further the significant government interest of controlling the proliferation of
cryptographic products). In fact, there has been at least one attempt by Congress to
preclude all judicial review of Commerce Department export control decisions, as Kam
seeks to challenge here. See The Omnibus Export Administration Act of 1995, 104th
Cong. § 112 (1995) (the so-called "anti-crypto amendment" to Section 112 regarding
Administrative and Judicial Review).
,4' Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 13.
'" Id. at 2-3. "The government clearly has an interest in preventing the proliferation
of cryptographic software to foreign powers, and the regulation of the export of the
cryptographic software is a rational means of achieving that goal. The Court will not
substitute its policy judgments for that of the President [citation omitted], especially in
the area of national security." Id. at 13.
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considered a deferential stance in rejecting Kam's challenge. Yet, as
Richey plainly notes, there is a strong basis both in law and reason for
such a ruling. While the judiciary rarely should be taken out of a fight
because of a "lack of expertise" or unsupported assertions of separation
of power conflict, this is just such a case where the courts simply do not
belong. It is the nature of the question that should compel such deference
by the courts43 - that is, can a lone citizen, or profit-seeking compa-
ny, using the judiciary as a conduit, challenge the government's determi-
nation, which is supported by regulations and laws passed by Congress
and enforced by the Executive, of what constitutes an external threat to
U.S. security, arguably the most fundamental and significant of all
govermental functions, essentially threat assessment? Karn stands for the
proposition, simply put, that there must be some things that remain
beyond judicial reproach, national security export controls being one of
them.
2. Bernstein v. United States Department of State'"
While Karn presented the cryptographic community with what could
be referred to as a status quo ruling, Bernstein took quite another path
when faced with a similar constitutional challenge. 45 The case began in
1995 when Daniel Bernstein, a then-graduate student in mathematics at
the University of California at Berkeley, brought suit against the Depart-
" See Hayden v. National Security Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(upholding National Security Agency's determination of what constitutes a threat to
national security interests, in the face of a FOIA request for classified information
relating to foreign signals intelligence collection, as being "the sort of situation where
Congress intended reviewing courts to respect the expertise of an agency").
'" 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
1 The ruling could be referred to as "status quo" in the sense that it gave
preeminence or maximum deference to national security considerations when responding
to a question involving the export of encryption technology, only until most recently
considered "munitions" by the Defense Department. See CRISIS, supra note 4, at 4
("For many years, concern over foreign threats to national security has been the pri-
mary driver of a national cryptography policy that has sought to maximize the protec-
tion of U.S. military and diplomatic communications while denying the confidentiality
benefits of cryptography to foreign adversaries through the use of export controls on
cryptography and related technical data"). Yet, the result and notably the level of
deference was markedly different in Berstein. See, e.g., 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1288
("Under such an exacting standard, defendants' interest here, in being able to break
foreign encryption and conduct adequate surveillance in furtherance of world peace and
the security and foreign policy of the United States, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1), are clearly
insufficient without more").
[Vol. 30:287
TOO MANY SECRETS
ment of State. Bernstein sought declaratory and injunctive relief from
enforcement of the AECA1  and ITAR, 4 as unconstitutional on their
face and as they applied to him."s
In a preliminary ruling on the government's motion to dismiss for
lack of justiciability, Judge Marilyn Patel held that cryptographic source
code was protected First Amendment "speech" and that constitutional
challenges to AECA and ITAR were justiciable.'49 In denying the
government's motion to dismiss, Judge Patel found that the plaintiff was
not seeking judicial review of the government's commodity jurisdiction
determination, which classified the software as a "defense article" under
ITAR and the USML; ° rather, plaintiff was merely seeking to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the statute and the regulations itself, which
were justiciable.' Thus, this court became the first court to recognize
a protected speech interest in computer code,' and the issue was trans-
formed from the realm of the government's interest in controlling the ex-
port of material deemed harmful to national security, or a "political
question" in Karn, to the right to speak cryptographically in Bernstein.
In Bernstein II, Judge Patel, facing cross-motions for summary
judgment, held that licensing requirements under AECA and ITAR con-
stituted unlawful prior restraint of cryptographic speech,'53 and that
national security, standing alone, did not justify the restraint, even if the
requirements were content neutral." The court, citing New York Times
Co. v. United States, found "national security, without more, too amor-
phous a rationale to abrogate the protections of the First Amend-
ment." 5  The court noted, and as Justice Stewart's separate opinion in
New York Times stated, that prior restraint is justified "only when disclo-
'4 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778.
' 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1997).
143 See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (N.D.
Cal. 1996).
' See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1439 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
ISO See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). "Once on the USML, and unless otherwise ex-
empted, a defense article or service requires a license before it can be imported or
exported," which in Bernstein's case made it a dead-letter. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at
1429.
' See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1431.
12 See Thinh Nguyen, Cryptography, Export Controls, and the First Amendment, in
Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 10 HARV. J.L. & TCH. 667, 672
(1997).
1 See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp at 1290, 1292.
"5 See id. at 1288.
15 Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (Black, J.
and Douglas, J. concurring).
31519981
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
sure would 'surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to
our nation or its people." 156 Judge Patel further stated, "[uinder such an
exacting standard, defendants' interests here, in being able to break
foreign encryption and conduct adequate surveillance in 'furtherance of
world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States,' 22
U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1), are clearly insufficient without more. ' '""r
Judge Patel's decision amounted to summary execution of controls
on the proliferation of strong crypto. Patel dismissed the political question
doctrine out of hand, quite in favor of a convoluted theory of cryptogra-
phy as pure speech and not a technology that transforms communication
between parties and makes no original speech expression in and of itself.
The political question doctrine has a rich history and cannot be put to
rest with a mere slight of the hand."5 8 Moreover, declaring crypto or
computer source code to be pure speech rather than conduct is highly
problematic."' "It is particularly ill-suited to the realities of computer
technology because software inseparably incorporates elements of both
expression and function."' "w First Amendment protections for pure
"' Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J.
and White, J. concurring).
tS Id.
,' See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 246 n.3 (1962) (discussing the sit-
uations in which the political question doctrine is applicable as including situations
where discretion rests properly in the hands of the executive or legislative branches).
Clearly, courts should and typically do consider constitutional questions that involve
issues of national security. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
718-19 (1971) (involving an injunction against the publication of policy papers regard-
ing the Vietnam Conflict). That is simply not in dispute. However, political questions
regarding the export of materials, as in this case with strong encryption, which arguably
possesses the ability to significantly alter the capacity of the U.S. intelligence communi-
ty to make timely and accurate assessments of potential national security risks, are
plainly not within the same sphere as publishing the Pentagon Papers. See also United
States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir.1990) ("[W]hether the export of a
given commodity would make a significant contribution to the military potential of
other countries ...is a political question not subject to review to determine whether
[it] had a basis in fact"). There is little doubt that the President possesses the requisite
power to evaluate what actually constitutes a valid "national security risk." See United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (finding inherent power
over national security matters vested in office of President by virtue of constitutional
authority in foreign relations).
I9 See Nguyen, supra note 152, at 675-79. "The problem with the court's analysis
is that it focuses too narrowly on the nature of computer source code, rather than
looking to the larger social context surrounding the regulated activities in which
software plays a part." Id. at 677.
0 Id. at 675-76.
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speech are justifiably far-reaching; however, crypto is hard pressed to fall
within those protections because it lacks the expression needed to invoke
those protections. 6' Crypto is a technological device for passing infor-
mation, not expression of pure speech. "A critical insight into the First
Amendment protections of speech is that it attaches not to particular
things or types of objects (such as computer source code) but to activities
where the free exchange of information and ideas is at stake (such as
publishing and giving a speech)."' 2
3. Junger v. Christopher"
A third suit has been filed by Peter D. Junger, a professor of law at
Case Western Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio, in
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.' Professor Junger
is seeking an injunction and declaratory relief against enforcement of
certain provisions of ITAR which seek to regulate the export of crypto-
graphic devices, data, and information." In short, he believes that ITAR
"' Id. at 675-79.
162 Id. at 677-78.
"62 See Plaintiffs Brief, Junger v. Christopher, No. 1:96 CV 1723 (N.D. Ohio, filed
Aug. 7, 1996) (all documents relative to this suit can be found on Professor Junger's
homepage available at <http://samsara.law.cwru.edu/>). Junger, while uneventfully
including as defendants the Secretary of State and the Director of State's Office of
Defense Trade Controls (ODTC), Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, agencies which
ostensibly administer the ITAR, made the additional and somewhat curious step of
including Lt. General Kenneth A. Minihan, Director of the National Security Agency
(NSA) as a defendant in his suit. See Complaint, Junger v. Christopher, No. 1:96 CV
1723 (N.D. Ohio, filed Aug. 7, 1996). Although it is well-known that the State
Department "consults" NSA before it approves or denies (or more probably even
whispers the word cryptography) anything, and in effect NSA has the final word on
crypto-ITAR questions, it had been, at least until present, implicitly considered
somewhat taboo, and likely the kiss of death, to include NSA as a defendant in any
suit. See William Tanenbaum, Computer Security and Encryption (In the Form of Fre-
quently Asked Questions), in MULTIMEDIA 1997: PROTECTING YOUR CLIENT'S LEGAL
AND BusiNEss INTEREsTS (available in WESTLAw, 467 PLI/PAT 575, 589) ("In practical
effect, the National Security Agency has de facto control over the issuance of export
licenses because the Department of State will not grant a license without NSA approv-
al").
" See Michele Fuetsch, Professor Fights U.S. On Encryption, PLAIN DEALER, Aug.
8, 1996, at B1.
"6 See PRESS RELEASE, PLAINTFF SEEKS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CLEVELAND CASE
CHALLENGING LICENSING OF EXPORTS OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION (Attorneys
Raymond Vasvari & Gino Scarselli, Oct. 1, 1996) (last visited Nov. 10, 1997)
<http://samsara.law.ewru.edu/comp-law/jue/pressrel2.htnl>.
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as it applies to crypto is unconstitutional because they deprive him of his
First Amendment right to academic freedom.'" Specifically, Professor
Junger alleges claims of prior restraint, overbreadth and vagueness, restric-
tions on academic and political speech, freedom of association, and
inference with a separation of powers.'6
It is important to note that unlike the arguments in Bernstein and
Karn, Junger does not, per se, challenge the constitutionality of requiring
one to get a license before exporting a physical cryptographic device.
However, requiring the permission of the government before one can
communicate knowledge is, in the words of Junger, unconstitutional.
Junger further claims that "[s]uch a prior restraint is, in fact, the
paradigmatic example of a violation of the First Amendment."'s
The crux of Professor Junger's claim against the State Department
(and of course NSA) results from a strict reading of the ITAR provisions
regarding what precisely constitutes an "export.', 169 ITAR, of course, is,
by effect and design, sweeping in impact. 7 ' Generally, ITAR prevents
disclosure of all crypto information, data, or performance of defense
services.' related to prohibited crypto.'" Professor Junger's concern
' See id.
,67 See Complaint at 32-70, Junger v. Christopher (No. 1:96 CV 1723).
's See PRESS RELEASE, supra note 165.
'6 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (1997) (An "export" under ITAR: "sending or taking a
defense article out of the United States in any manner," id. § 120(a)(1), "disclosing
(oral or visual) or transferring technical data to a foreign person whether in the United
States or abroad," id. § 120.17(a)(4), "performing a defense service on behalf of, or for
the benefit of, a foreign person," id. § 120.17(a)(5).). Of note, Professor Junger's
concern regarding exposure of ITAR regulated crypto to "foreign persons" is by no
means unheard of, as it has consistently been a serious concern with American
businesses, which use crypto both here and abroad, employing foreign nationals for
work in the U.S. and abroad. Mostly these "exports," though, would be inadvertent. See
Baker FAQ, supra note 85, at 298-300. Junger, however, intentionally wants to disclose
1TAR-regulated matter.
170 Remember, of course, ITAR's purpose is to regulate the export of items, data,
devices, or information considered by the government potentially to have an adverse
impact on national security. See supra notes 78, 79, 90 and accompanying text.
'" Section 120.9 defines "defense services" as furnishing of assistance to foreign
persons with respect to defense articles or the furnishing of technical data to foreign
persons, in the U.S. or abroad. 22 C.F.R. § 120.9 (1997).
" See 22 C.F.R. pts. 123-25. Under ITAR, all crypto that comes within its
somewhat murky domain requires special licensing and approval. As notes 87-88
explain, anything over 40-bits is routinely denied, unless it falls under prescribe
exceptions, such as use in financial networks or used for authentication purposes.
Consequently, as Professor Junger correctly asserts, disclosure to a foreign person, here
or abroad, of "prohibited" crypto would violate ITAR, save obtaining a license, which
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is that he might violate ITAR if he discloses ostensibly iTAR-regulated
cryptographic software and technical data to foreign persons, in the course
of his duties as a law professor. He also wishes to publish course materi-
als and articles containing this same sort of cryptographic information."n
Moreover, Junger believes that he should freely be able to send his
"materials" abroad without regulation and licensing by the State Depart-
ment." In particular, Professor Junger asserts in his Complaint,
By requiring registration and a license prior to the disclosure of unclas-
sified cryptographic software or cryptographic technical data within the
United States, the defendants are engaged in controlling the exchange of
cryptographic information between persons within the United States,
including the dissemination of cryptographic information on the Internet.
The defendants have therefore adopted a de facto policy of restricting
the domestic dissemination of unclassified cryptographic information
which has the direct effect of restricting the availability of cryptographic
software within the United States."5
Professor Junger, in short, challenges the constitutional validity of a
regulation which not only seeks to restrict the dissemination of crypto
beyond U.S. borders, but has the indirect effect of restricting his speech
and conduct within the U.S. with respect to crypto.
Clearly, his argument is novel and should be closely watched. 76
However, it is likely that, if anything, the public domain exception will
either be re-crafted or interpreted in such a way as to allow Professor
Junger to disseminate his materials in the classroom before any court
finds ITAR unconstitutional on the grounds asserted by Professor
Junger.'1
is arguably not only impractical but likely impossible.
See Complaint at 1, Junger v. Christopher (No. 1:96 CV 1723).
' See id.
'n See id. ( 64.
,76 Professor Junger has filed a revised complaint in light of recent changes to the
regulations controlling crypto.
" Ostensibly, the "public domain" exception to ITAR provides the necessary "out"
for Professor Junger's concerns. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.11 (1997) ("information which is
published and which is generally accessible or available to the public . . . "). However,
as some commentators have noted this appears to exempt from controls only "informa-
tion" and not "data" (including software), which Junger also seeks to "export." See Ira
S. Rubinstein, Export Controls on Encryption Software, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT
CONTROLS 1995, at 401, 410 (PLI Comm. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series,
1995).
31919981
CASE W. RES. J. INL L.
C. The Essence of the Debate Over Strong Crypto
As we move into the twenty-first century, we must provide our law
enforcement and national security officials with the tools that they need
to do their jobs in the Information Age. The issue ... centers upon a
technology that some claim makes the jobs of law enforcement, national
security, and armed services more difficult. However, governmental
policy regulating this technology is beginning to pose some very serious
commercial concerns. 7
There is little question that enormous advances in telecommunications
in the fifty years have created the opportunity for public use of encryp-
tion to ensure the privacy and integrity of business and personal commu-
nicationsY9 However, at the same time, these same advances seriously
threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
intercept a broad range of signal intelligence 8' targets, for instance,
narcotraffickers, organized crime, terrorists, and foreign espionage
agents."' Diverse interests are in diametric opposition to each other.
industry's right to sell and the public's right to use crypto versus the
government's duty to protect.'8
Law enforcement and national security intelligence communities
argue that if unmitigated proliferation of strong crypto is allowed, crimi-
nals, terrorists, and foreign intelligence targets of interest will not only
evaporate, but eventually disappear entirely, which would in turn seriously
compromise the government's ability to protect the security of the State
and the safety of its citizens.8 3
Opponents of controls on the proliferation of crypto, on the other
hand, contend that the public has a right to and expectation of crypto-
enhanced privacy, strong privacy.' They argue that the criminals and
spies have plenty of other crypto available worldwide, and therefore there
" Online Encryption Technology: A Bill to Loosen Restrictions, supra note 10
(statement of Chairman Sen. John McCain).
" See Lance J. Hoffman, Afterword to BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER 549 (Lance J.
Hoffman ed., 1995) (quoting a May 3, 1993 Memo to the U.S. Deputy Sec. of Defense
from Charles A. Hawkins, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (C31)).
"~ Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is a category of intelligence information comprising
of communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign
instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). See infra note 220 (defining terms).
... See Hoffman, supra note 179, at 549.
" See id.
18 See id.
See id.
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is simply no need to restrict U.S.-built crypto.'"
[Moreover], the computer industry points out that it has one of the few
remaining positive trade balances and that it is vital that the dominance
of the American computer industry in world markets be preserved. The
industry fears that this will be lost if offshore developers incorporate
high-quality cryptography into their products while U.S. industry either
cannot do so or suffers higher costs or delays due to requirements for
export licenses because of strict controls of export of cryptography."
Of course, the government does not deny the importance of strong
encryption to U.S. companies and private citizens alike." Indubitably,
encryption products both serve to protect proprietary data of U.S. compa-
nies worldwide" and have the potential to be an economic boom in the
cryptography software market." Obviously, the problem is reconciling
all of these competing interests and sorting out the extremes, which are
numerous, but without compromising any one interest too much. If that
sounds impossible, then maybe it is.
' See id.
' Id.
' See The White House, Office Of The Vice President, Statement Of The Vice
President, Oct. 1, 1996 (stating that "[tihe Administration's initiative recognizes that an
industry-led technology strategy will expedite market acceptance of key recovery, and
that the ultimate solution must be market-driven."); see also Text of a Letter From
President To The Speaker Of The House Of Representatives And The President Of The
Senate (visited Nov. 15, 1996) <http://www.law.miani.edu/%7Efroomkin/nov96-regs.htm>
(stating that "because of the increasingly widespread use of encryption products for the
legitimate protection of the privacy of data and communications in nonmilitary contexts;
[and] because of the importance to U.S. economic interests of the market for encryption
products . . . [encryption products will no longer be designated as defense articles on
the U.S. Munitions List]).
,3 See ACM, supra note 91, at 1 (noting that in the 1970s, thousands of phone
conversation that were conducted on IBM's private microwave network by IBM execu-
tives concerning business were "systematically eavesdropped upon by Soviet intelligence
agents").
" See Evans, supra note 93, at 480 (arguing that the software industry is one of
the fastest growing industries in the United States, and as the demand for software
increases, so too will the demand for security-related products such as encryption
software). But see ACM, supra note 91, at 12 (noting that "cryptography remains a
niche market in which (with the exception of several hundred million dollars a year in
government sales by a few major corporations) a handful of companies gross only a
few tens of millions of dollars annually"). The fervent supporters of a wide-open, and
profitable, cryptography market have prophesied for almost twenty years an explosion
in the market. Id. In fact, in 1978 Whitfield Diffie, inventor of public key cryptogra-
phy, "predicted that it would become ubiquitous by the mid-1980s." Id. at 13 n.6.
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This, in a nutshell, is the cryptographic policy debate."l
V. THE NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE
The Necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not
be further urged-all that Remains for me to add is, that you keep the
whole matter as secret as possible For upon Secrecy, Success depends
in Most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally
defeated, however well planned & promising a favorable issue.'
- George Washington
Despite the potential economic benefits of decontrolling cryptography,
decontrol also presents a number of compelling threats to national securi-
ty. Opposition to further proliferation of strong encryption is predicated
on a basic assumption-that wide-spread use of unbreakable cryptography
is, to put it very mildly, not such a good thing. While it is recognized
that a significant number of encryption programs are already available
from non-U.S. sources worldwide, and in many cases obtained quite
cheaply and easily,'" it would appear not to be in the best interests of
the United States, as a pure security matter, to contribute to the prolifera-
tion of encryption. This would be much as the United States chooses in
many cases to restrict the export of other military-related technology that
is also available from other sources." Should the United States allow
the export of sophisticated missile technology, just because it just so
happens that the Chinese and the Russians have similar systems available
on the open-market? That seems absurd, but it is exactly what opponents
190 There are, of course, myriad of arguments against some or any controls on strong
encryption. There is the economic argument that U.S. export controls threaten the U.S.
software industry's ability to compete in foreign markets. See, e.g., Evans, supra note
93, at 488-90. Dovetailing with that is the argument that key escrow will also stifle
competitiveness because nobody would want to buy a product with a U.S. government
back-door built into it. Additionally, probably the most prominent of crypto decontrol
arguments concerns issues of privacy and the First Amendment. See Metaphor, supra
note 1, at 812-21.
"9 George Washington, writing to a friend in 1777, reprinted in SECRET INTELL-
GENCE, at xv (1989).
'" See Metaphor, supra note 1, at 748 (arguing that U.S. export regulations designed
to prevent the proliferation of strong encryption have generally failed). See also Encryp-
ton Policy, supra note 9 (noting that as of June 1996, Trusted Information Systems
identified 1262 encryption programs worldwide from 68 countries; of these 730 were
produced or distributed in the U.S.; the remaining 532 were of foreign origin).
193 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, EXPORT CONTROLS AND
NONPROLIFERATION PoLicY O.T.A.-ISS-596, 56 (1994) (noting that arguing for decontrol
of exports because they can be found elsewhere is analogous to allowing uncontrolled
gun sales to criminals simply because they can get them anyway).
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of controls are arguing. Why help an already bad situation get worse?
A. No More Secrets
The phrase "No More Secrets" is a cryptic reference to the "little
black box" device that forms the essential plot component for the film
Sneakers.'94 The film presents an interesting problem: what if there were
a device which could decrypt any and all encryption. That is, what if
there were no more secrets, at least for the fortunate holder of the device.
It is not hard to imagine that such a device would be enough to kill for,
as the plot of the movie no doubt suggests." But what does this have
to do with the proliferation of strong crypto? Imagine the inverse of "no
more secrets," that is, "too many secrets." What would be the impact to
U.S. national security if strong encryption were abundantly available to
terrorists or organized crime elements?" Security invariably would be
compromised - too many secrets."9
11 See SNEAKERS (Universal 1992) (starring in addition to Robert Redford, most
notably, are Sidney Poitier, Dan Akroyd, River Phoenix, and Ben Kingsley). The film's
plot involves Redford and his high-tech surveillance team, a sort of a 90's version of
the Dirty Dozen (that is, mostly a group of misfits, ex-spooks, and computer geniuses),
battling the forces of evil, represented by the former 60's student radical turned Mafia
"aecountant"/information systems manager, Ben Kingsley, who incidentally has obtained
a black box which has the capability to decrypt any and all encryption schemes. In the
film, Redford uses a Scrabble board to decrypt the ostensible "cover" name for the lit-
tle black box, SETEC Astronomy - which breaks out to be, "too many secrets." Upon
reaching this discovery, River Phoenix emphatically says, "So it is a code breaker?."
Redford replies in an ominous tone, "No, it is the code breaker.. . no more secrets."
' Id. (Sidney Poiter "There isn't a government on this planet that wouldn't kill us
all for that thing").
" The point of this scenario is not to suggest that some form of strong crypto is
not available at any given moment worldwide, as it is. Rather, the point is that just
because something is available, for example, nuclear weapons, does not necessarily
mean that a country should export their "wares."
"9 See Online Encryption Technology: A Bill to Loosen Restrictions, supra note 10
(statement of William P. Crowell, Deputy Director, National Security Agency) (noting
that "if we overemphasize the public interests, we risk a world with too much
government access and too few secrets . . . [while] if we overemphasize the interests
of the private sector, we risk a world with perhaps too many secrets - for example,
a world in which terrorists, organized crime, and hackers acquire the capability to
operate with impunity") (emphasis added).
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B. Threat or Perceived Threat?
The world isn't run by weapons any more, or energy or money; it's run
by little ones and zeros, little bits of data. Its all just electrons...
there's a war out there old friend, a world war, and it's not about who's
got the most bullets; its about who controls the information, what we
see and hear, how we work, what we think; its all about the infor-
mation. 1s
Those in favor of relaxation of control on encryption, typically
software executives with a less than objective view, in other words, a
serious eye on potential "profits,"' lament often and loudly about the
"economic national security" of the United States.' The traditional na-
tional security threat is often presented with a certain cavalier attitude."'
However, opponents of national security export controls often miss the
fundamental point, and quite obviously misunderstand the nature of
signals intelligence collection. It clearly serves their interest to present
'93 See SNEAKERs (Universal 1992) (Ben Kingsley).
" This, by no means, is the only "pro-proliferation" group. As discussed in Section
M1 B, there are serious constitutional questions regarding controls on strong encryption
that have yet to be completely resolved. Those challenging controls on encryption in
a constitutional context can be considered "pro-proliferation," to some extent. However,
it is important to understand that the labels are ultimately unimportant. What is im-
portant, and what this and the following sections address, is whether the invocation by
the current Administration of what is essentially a trump card - "a national security
threat," warrants more than the perfunctory dismissal it has generally been given by the
pro-proliferation group. National security is an inherently nebulous concept. Therefore,
for the national security perspective to maintain a significant position within the debate
over controls, some effort at explaining it within the context of cryptography must be
undertaken. Whether the level of threat is in fact substantial, significant or compelling
enough to overcome (trump) challenges, constitutional or otherwise, to controls on
strong encryption is not within the design of this Note. Rather, this Note seeks only
to explain the national security threat perspective and advocate a balancing of all
significant interests.
o That is, the competitiveness argument that the U.S. software industry cannot
compete abroad if they cannot export strong crypto in their products. In actuality,
encryption software currently accounts for about one to three percent of the total
software market. See A Study of the International Market for Computer Software with
Encryption, U.S. Dept. of Commerce and the National Security Agency, Washington,
D.C., 1996.
2' See, e.g., Judge Patel's decision in Bernstein v. United States Department of
State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
See Steven Levy, The Cypherpunks vs. Uncle Sam, N. Y. TIMEs, June 12, 1994,
§ 6, reprinted in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER 266, at 268 (Lance J. Hoffman, ed.,
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the national security issues in a one-dimensional manner. However, it
is important not to misjudge or misstate the potential of the threat in the
race to solve this prickly problem. "The government [clearly] understands
the impossibility of eradicating strong crypto. [Rather], its objective is to
prevent unbreakable encryption from becoming routine." Because if
that happens, even the dumbest and poorest criminals and terrorists in the
world would have automatic extreme privacy for their criminal acts.'
Dorothy E. Denning, a Georgetown University computer scientist
who is very active in the crypto debate, writes, "[a]ll communications on
the information highway would be immune from lawful interception. In
a world threatened by international organized crime, terrorism and rogue
governments, this would be folly." Additionally, Denning writes,
"[w]e would have havoc in the United States .... Lawlessness would
prevail."' If Denning is even marginally correct, crypto cannot, as
some would have it, go uncontrolled. FBI Director Louis Freeh has
testified before the Commerce Committee that if export controls were
weakened without providing for a key-escrow system, national security
1995). Stewart A. Baker, former general counsel to NSA, explains the fundamental
misunderstanding, "[t]he concern is not so much what happens today when people go
in and buy voice scramblers; it is the prospect that in 5 years or 10 years every phone
you buy that costs $75 or more will have an encrypt button on it that will interoperate
with every other phone in the country and suddenly we will discover that our entire
communications network is being used in ways that are profoundly antisocial. That's
the real concern .... If we are going to have a standardized form of encryption that
is going to change the world, we should think seriously about what we are going to
do when it is misused." Id. at 272-73. Although Mr. Baker's comments ostensibly deal
with "domestic security," his observations are, given the current atmosphere in world
affairs and terrorism, applicable to national security in general.
' See, e.g., Pro-CODE Hearings, supra note 58 (testimony of Barbara Simons,
Chair, U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association of Computing Machinery).
We recognize that the government has a legitimate interest in protecting national
security. However, the government's proposals are becoming increasingly difficult to
achieve as strong encryption programs are available and extensively used worldwide.
Whether the U.S. Government keeps current export controls in place, or attempts to
impose restrictions even on domestic use of encryption, the role of the national security
agencies will remain difficult. Thus, we suggest that a policy which serves the long
term interests of our nation's security will not be one based on key escrow, but rather
one that anticipates the widespread availability of strong encryption.
Id. at 115.
' Levy, supra note 202, at 272.
2 Id.
6 Dorothy Denning, The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime, NEwSDAY, Feb. 22, 1994.
(quoted in Luke Seemann, Keys to Secret Drawers, also available (visited Sept. 29,
1996) <www.stardot.com/~lukeseem/j202/essay.html>.
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would be at risk.2
Previously, control of the availability and use of cryptography was
presented as a national-security issue focused outward, with the intention
of maintaining a U.S. technological lead over other countries. Now, with
an increasing policy focus on domestic crime and terrorism, the avail-
ability and use of cryptography has also come into prominence as a
domestic-security, law-enforcement issue. More widespread foreign use
of cryptography - including use by terrorists and developing countries
- makes U.S. signals intelligence more difficult. Within the United
States, cryptography is increasingly portrayed as a threat to domestic
security (public safety) and a barrier to law enforcement if it is readily
available for use by terrorists or criminals. There is also growing
recognition of the potential misuses of cryptography, such as by disgrun-
fled employees as a means to sabotage an employer's databases. Thus,
export controls, intended to restrict the international availability of U.S.
cryptography technology and products, are now being joined with
domestic cryptography initiatives intended to preserve U.S. law-enforce-
ment and signals-intelligence capabilities.2'
In fact, the traditional boundaries between "law enforcement" and the
"intelligence community" have substantially blurred since the end of the
Cold War."' Control of the availability and use of crypto has typically
been presented as a purely "national security" issue, "focused outward,
with the intention of maintaining a U.S. technological lead over other
countries and preventing encryption devices from falling into the 'wrong
hands' overseas."' U.S. crypto policy focused outward because the
greatest threat appeared, and in fact was for a long time, outward - that
is, widespread foreign use of strong encryption products and use by
terrorists or developing countries potentially makes U.S. signals intel-
ligence collection, an already difficult proposition, even more difficult
still."2 But in the last ten years, due to budget constraints and a signifi-
cant increase in domestic terror crimes, often originating outside the
United States, the availability or proliferation of encryption technology
' FBI Says Senate Encryption Bill Could Jeopardize National Security, COMMU-
NICATIONS TODAY, July 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10162133.
209 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION SECUrITY
AND PRIVACY IN NErwORK ENVIRONMENTS, 9-10 (1994).
20 See Philip B. Heymann, Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Last Years of
the Twentieth Century, 18 NAT'L SEC. L. REP. 1 (Winter 1996).
2"r U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IssuE UPDATE ON INFOR-
MATION SECuRrrY AND PRIVACY IN NETwoRK ENvIRONMENTS 7 (June 1995).
212 See id.
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has become a domestic-security/law enforcement issue.213 Strong en-
cryption, therefore, can be perceived as a potential threat to the funda-
mental security of the United States, which effectively brings issues
concerning domestic security firmly within the envelope of national
security.21 4 "Thus, export controls, intended to restrict the international
availability of U.S. cryptography technology and products, are now being
joined with domestic cryptography initiatives, like key-escrow encryption,
that are intended to preserve U.S. law enforcement and signal-intelligence
capabilities.""21 It is with this fundamental breakdown of the traditional
dichotomy between intelligence and law enforcement in mind that the
domestic security factoris discussed along with issues concerning the in-
telligence community in the sections that follow.
1. Impact on Foreign Signals-Intelligence Collection216
Intelligence organizations provide the foreknowledge to the national
leadership ("the princes")2 . and military commanders ("the gener-
als")2"8 by gathering intelligence information from a myriad of sources,
evaluating this information to determine accuracy, analyzing the informa-
tion from all available sources, and finally producing and dissemination
an intelligence product or report to the consumer.2P9
The ability to intercept and exploit foreign signals intelligence" is
213 See id.
214 See id.
215 Id.
216 Intelligence is the "product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis,
integration, and interpretation of all information concerning one or more aspects of for-
eign countries or areas, which is immediate or potentially significant to the development
and execution of plans, policies, and operations." DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note
30, at 175.
217 A reference to Sun Tzu's "princes." See supra note 2 and accompanying quota-
tion.
238 A reference to Sun Tzu's "generals." See supra note 2 and accompanying quota-
tion.
219 David L. Christianson, Signals Intelligence, in THE MILITARY INTELUGENCE COM-
MuNrrY 39, 39 (Gerald W. Hopple and Bruce W. Watson eds., 1989).
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) encompasses three specific collection disciplines,
communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (LNT), and foreign
instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). See Christianson, supra note 219, at 39-
40. COMINT refers to those activities that produce intelligence "by interception and
processing of foreign communications passsed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic
means ... and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however
transmitted. Interception comprises search, intercept, and direction-finding. Processing
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fundamental and necessary to U.S. security."2 The NSA is the primary
agency charged with the collection of foreign signals intelligence for the
U.S. government'
Cryptology is vital to the U.S. intelligence community. Without the
ability to decrypt enciphered communications, the value of signals
intelligence activities would be diminished significantly. The history of
the U.S. intelligence community, through and including operations during
the Persian Gulf War, is replete with instances when the intelligence
community's cryptanalytic skills provided the critical ingredient to
successful U.S. military operations. Cryptology also plays a prominent
role in the intelligence community's ability to meet new challenges in
the post-Cold War world: the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, terrorism, narcotics-trafficking, and economic competitive-
ness.
2M
The fact that strong encryption presents a threat to intelligence
collection efforts, both at home and abroad, is rarely seriously ques-
tioned.' However, the extent the government should recognize that
threat, at the expense, for example, of the software industry, has been
very much at issue.2
comprises range estimation, transmitter operator identification, signal analysis, traffic
analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plaintext, the fusion of these processes, and
the reporting of the results ... ." DESMOND BALL, SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA 122 (1993) (quoting U.S. National Security Council Directive no.
6, 17 Feb. 1972). COMINT is widely regarded as both the most prevalent and the
most valuable intelligence. Telephone interview with high-level NSA signals
intelliegence analyst (Dec. 30, 1997). While the vast majority of communications traffic
is now transmitted without the use of encryption technology, that could well change if
good, cheap, and fast crypto is encouraged to proliferate. See id.
" See Report to Accompany HR 3937, Hearings on the Omnibus Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1994 before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, (H.R. REP.
No. 103-531) (1994) available at (last visited Oct. 29, 1997) <http://www.eff.orglpubl
Privacy/1TAR-export/hr3937-intell-cmte.report> [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 103-531]
(commenting after receiving a thorough, classified briefing on the damaging implications
of altering the present encryption control regime). See also Johnson, supra note 4, at
7 (stating that intelligence is widely considered America's "first line of defense").
m See Online Encryption Technology: A Bill to Loosen Restrictions, supra note 10
(written statement by William P. Crowell, Deputy Director, National Security Agency).
23 Id.
, See, e.g., Metaphor, supra note 1, at 744-46, 850-56 (acknowleging strong crypto
inhibits intelligence collection efforts but arguing nonetheless that controls on crypto are
overly reliant on the exploitation of the criminal archetype).
" See, e.g., Evans, supra note 93, at 490; Mark B. Hartzler, National Security
Export Controls on Data Encryption-How They Limit U.S. Competitiveness, 29 TEXAS
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Louis J. Freeh, Director of the FBI, recently stated that "the potential
use of such robust encryption products by a vast array of criminals and
terrorists to conceal their criminal communications and information poses
an extremely serious and, in my view, unacceptable threat to public
safety." The proliferation of unbreakable crypto prevents intelligence
collection agencies from understanding seized files and intercepted
communications.' Consequently, the ability of the U.S. government to
thwart or later investigate dangerous criminal, terrorist, espionage, and
rouge government activities is seriously and fundamentally threatened.'
"The intelligence community's cryptologic success depends in part on
controlling the use of encryption by targets of intelligence interest. This
assists in the provision of responsive, timely, and accurate intelligence
support to policy-makers and the military. Controlling the dissemination
of sophisticated encryption has been and will continue to be critical to
those successes and U.S. national security interests." 9 If unbreakable
crypto proliferates critical law enforcement and signals intelligence
collection tools will be nullified. = There have been a number of specif-
ic cases that illustrate the significant impact proliferation presents to U.S.
intelligence efforts. For example, encryption to thwart intelligence
collection was detected in the Aldrich Ames spy case. 2 Ramzi Yousef,
alleged mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, used encryption
to protect files relating to his terrorist activities on his computer. 3
These are just two examples of a number of recent cases involving the
use of crypto to thwart intelligence or law enforcement efforts.' "As
encryption proliferates and becomes an ordinary component of mass
market items, and as the strength of encryption products increases, the
threat to public safety will increase proportionately."' 5
It is only by building and maintaining a strong intelligence effort,
INT'L LJ. 437, 440 (1994).
' Pro-CODE Hearings, supra note 58, at 13 (quoting the prepared statement of
Louis L French, Director FBI).
227 See id.
See id.
HR. Rep. No. 103-531, supra note 221.
2" See Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary House
of Representatives, 105th Cong. 33 (1997) (statement of Robert S. Litt, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division).
23, Id. at 36.
2n Id.
2 Id. at 37.
" Id.
2" Id.
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including the aggressive exploitation of signals intelligence targets, that
adequate warning of threats to U.S. national security can be detected and
thwarted.' "America's emphasis on technology in the development of
intelligence systems has certainly paid off handsomely. No other nation
has an intelligence organization that even approaches the U.S.
capability. ' '"7 The American intelligence community has a global reach,
which is a crucial and unique national security asset?8
Communications intelligence has never been more valuable to
national security. 9 Advances in communications technology breed a
corresponding increase in communications intelligence product, which in
turn is accompanied by a similar growth in techniques for protecting
communications, particularly cryptography. 2'
What is not widely appreciated, however, is that despite the remarkable
developments of cryptography, the communications intelligence products
are now better than ever. In the recent past, there has been a migration
of communications from more secure media such as wirelines or physi-
cal shipment of microwave and satellite channels; this migration has so
far outstripped the application of any protective measure. Consequently,
communication intelligence is so valuable that protection of its flow by
keeping secret both the intelligence technology itself and techniques for
protecting communication is an important objective of U.S. national
236 See A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT,
JULY 1994, THE WIrE HOUSE. See also THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADviSORS ON
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Science, Technology, and National Security 6 (Dec. 1992)
("The principal threat to our future military security arises from the growing pro-
liferation of modem weapons and associated people and technology").
2 Bruce W. Watson, The Future of the Intelligence Community, in THE MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE COMMuNTrrY 289, 290 (Gerald W. Hopple and Bruce W. Watson eds.,
1989).
233 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 236. See also BALL, supra note
220, at 3 ("The United States maintains the most sophisticated SIGINT capabilities and
operations in the world today").
239 See ACM, supra note 91, at 22; JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 14 (noting that
SIGINT can be the key to averting war by tipping off a belligerent's attack plans that
then may be effectively countered by stepped-up diplomacy or a show of force).
SIGINT, however, may also contribute to the preservation of individual American lives
abroad. Id. "Recently a U.S. ambassador was forced to plan an evacuation because of
a civil war that was spreading through the country in which he was stationed. A
SIGINT intercept disclosed that a team of assassins had learned of the proposed
evacuation route and intended to slay the ambassador, his wife, and children. Warned
of the trap, the ambassador and his family took a different route to the airport and
escaped." Id.
240 See id. at 21-25.
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security policy.24
2. Impact on Domestic Security as a Function of National Security
The functional and geographic separation of domestic law enforce-
ment and intelligence ended during this last decade.242 This occurred for
the most part because of new problems with terrorism and drug traffick-
ing and a renewed vigor on the part of the FBI to exercise their statutory
authority to investigate terrorist attacks on Americans or American
property, such as aircraft, wherever they may occur u" Controls on
cryptography, consequently, became as important at home as they always
have been abroad. "Strong encryption is increasingly portrayed as a threat
to domestic security (public safety) and a barrier to law enforcement if it
is readily available for use by terrorists or criminals."' " Export controls,
intended to prevent international proliferation of U.S. encryption technol-
ogy, are consequently being joined with domestic cryptography initiatives,
like key recovery proposals, and criminal penalties for use of encryption
to further a crime, that seek to preserve law enforcement and signal-
intelligence capabilitiesUS
Often, wiretapping can make or break a case.' Each year wiretaps
or other electronic surveillance methods are responsible for the arrests of
more than 2,000 persons, of which 20% typically end up in a convic-
tion.u7 Stewart Baker, former General Counsel to NSA, has noted that
there has already been documented cases where encryption has foiled
efforts of law enforcement. The most notable case was that of a child
pornographer in Santa Clara, California.2" James Kallstrom of the FBI
241 See id,
242 See Heymann, supra note 210, at 4.
243 See id. at 4-5.
244 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TEcHNoLOGY AssEssMENT, IssuE UPDATE ON INFOR-
MATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS 7 (June 1995).
24 See id.
24 See Seemann, supra note 63.
247 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Report on Applications for Orders
Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications.
Washington, D.C., Apr., 1993.
24 See Pro-CODE Hearings, supra note 58, at 14 (statement of Louis J. Freeh,
Director, FBI) (noting that encryption has specifically been used by a child pornogra-
pher to transmit obscene images over the Internet, within a major drug-trafficking case,
and currently is being advocated by several anti-government militia groups to prevent
law enforcement investigation); see also Seemann, supra note 63 (arguing that there are
in fact no longer any "secret drawers" (referring to the seemingly prophetic statement
of Justice Louis Brandeis that "[w]ays may some day be developed by which the Gov-
ernment, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court")
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testified before a House subcommittee hearing on communications, priva-
cy, and security that "[w]ithout the ability to effectively execute court
orders for electronic surveillance, we would be unable to protect our
Nation against foreign threats, terrorism, espionage, violent crime, drug
trafficking, kidnapping, and other crimes." 9 For example, almost ninety
percent of the narcotics leads related to money laundering came directly
from domestic wiretaps.
Key escrow is no doubt both an attempt to appease those who
lament crypto controls and in fact an effort to strengthen the
government's position relative to the proliferation of strong crypto. The
primary opponents of this scheme often forcefully argue that it simply
will not work because no criminal or terrorist in his or her right mind
would use crypto that is escrowed."' However, as with many of the
national security issues, the anti-escrow lobby simply misses the point. 2
Encryption is available today, but because it is neither standardized nor
ubiquitous, using, buying, and distributing the crypto gear to members of
the criminal conspiracy is impracticableY13 "Up to now only a few
criminals have had the resources, sophistication, and discipline to use
specialized encryption systems. What worries law enforcement agencies.
. . is a world where encryption is standardized and ubiquitous.' '" Such
a world, that is, where anyone can get "in crypto" for a few bucks and
in a matter of minutes, would be disastrous for law enforcementY5 The
idea behind the key escrow initiative is to provide strong enough crypto
to meet legitimate security concerns, private and commercial, without
by virtue of modern technology, and therefore the only answer is encryption - strong
and for all to use).
249 Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security: Hearing Before
the House Subcomm. on Technology, Env't and Aviation of the Comm. on Science,
Space and Technology, 103d Cong. 10 (1994) (statement of James Kallstrom, FBI)
(indicating that in the ten-year period ending in 1992, more than 22,000 convictions
have resulted from court-ordered electronic surveillance activity).
m See Internet Security Monthly, Feb. 1995, for remarks by Adm. Bobby Inman at
MIT class, 11/21/94 (Inman was formerly a director of the NSA, Deputy Director of
the CIA, and Director of Naval Intelligence).
"' See Stewart Baker, Don't Worry Be Happy, Why Clipper is Good For You,
HoTwn;m NErwoRK (visited Sept. 9, 1996) <http://www.hotwired.com/wired/2.06/
features/nsa.elipper.html>. Also published in WmDa, June 1994. Stewart Baker is former
General Counsel of the National Security Agency. He now practices international law
in Washington D.C. with Steptoe & Johnson.
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"building a web of standardized encryption that shuts law enforcement
agencies out."'  In short, those criminal elements who want to avoid
the escrowed-crypto used by the business world at large will* have to
build their own devices and even then the crypto would not be able
to interact with the devices used by the rest of society. 8 As one FBI
agent aptly points out, "[niobody will build secure phones just to sell to
the Gambino family. '' 9
Most of the attention regarding key escrow has been directed at
privacy issues. Many liken "the idea of key escrow to being forced to
deposit keys to your front door with the government." However, once
again, privacy - advocates miss the big picture. In reality, using a key
escrow system will create more privacy safeguards from illegal law
enforcement activity2 For example, "agents will have to satisfy the
phone company that the wiretap is legitimate, then satisfy both custodial
agencies." 2
Key escrow is only an attempt by law enforcement to keep up with
technology, not overwhelm it. 3 Clearly, law enforcement would not, as
some have argued, have an open-door to intercept whatever communica-
tions they want.' Law enforcement would be subject to. the same
constitutional and statutory safeguards regarding privacy and wiretapping
that now exist without escrowed encryption. "It is only a device to
maintain the current level of wiretapping ability law enforcement agencies
2 Id.
' As they do now. Id.
2' Id.
259 Id.
o See Seemann, supra note 63.
2' Id.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Howard S. Dakoff, Note, The Clipper Chip
Proposal: Deciphering the Unfounded Fears that are Wrongfully Derailing its Imple-
mentation, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 475, 497-98. The article concludes that key
escrow "will not provide the government with any more power to pry into individual
private lives than the current system for wiretapping provides. It is only a device to
maintain the current level of wiretapping ability law enforcement agencies have at their
disposal." Id. at 498.
' See id. at 493-97 (discussing the law enforcement and escrowed encryption con-
troversy).
' See id. at 494-96 (discussing how Title m would apply to communications
intercepted with a clipper chip and, thus, limit the government's ability to intercept
communications).
' See id. at 491-94 (describing the Title m standards which must be met for an
intercept of communications to be constitutional).
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have at their disposal. The Clipper Chip is not Orwellian;' it is merely
a product of the evolution of the Technological Age." 7
C. Crypto Anarchy?
A specter is haunting the modem world, the specter of crypto anarchy
... Ujust as the technology of printing altered and reduced the power
of medieval guilds and the social power structure, so too will
cryptologic methods fundamentally alter the nature of corporations and
of government interference in economic transactions.'
The term "crypto anarchy" was coined several years ago by a group
techno-anarchists. 9 As its catchy name suggests, it envisions a Brave
New World in which governments disintegrate and individuals form the
nucleus of society, without, of course, all forms of government interfer-
enceY Proponents, most vocally, Tim May,z" argue that crypto anar-
chy is an inevitable, and of course desirable, outcome of the proliferation
of public key crypto.tm "With this technology, they say, it will be im-
possible for governments to control information, compile dossiers, conduct
wiretaps, regulate economic arrangements, and even collect taxes. Individ-
uals will be liberated from coercion by their physical neighbors and by
governments." But is this such a good thing?
Surprisingly, even Tim May, the apparent leader of the movement,
acknowledges the apparent danger of widespread availability of unbreak-
able crypto. 4 He, however, tends to embrace it rather than fear it. With
government essentially locked out, "computers and telecommunications
systems would become safe havens for criminal activity... [providing]
26 See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 5 (1949) ("Big Brother is watching you").
2 Dakoff, supra note 193, at 498.
Timothy C. May, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, reprinted in HIGH NOON ON
THE ELECI'RONIC FRONTJER 237 (1996) [hereinafter Manifesto].
' See generally Timothy C. May, Cyphernomicon (visited Nov. 2, 1997)
<http.//swiss.ai.mit.edu/6805/articles/crypto/cypherpunks/cyphemomicon/CP-FAQ>[hereinaf-
ter Cyphernomicon] (outlining the history of the cyperpunks and crypto anarchy
movements).
270 Id. [ 16.4.2.
See, e.g., Timothy C. May, Crypto Anarchy and Virtual Communities (visited Oct
26, 1997) <http:llwww.powergrid.com/1.O1/cryptoanarchy-wp.html#8a>.
m See id.
273 Dorothy Denning, The Future of Cryptography (last modified Jan. 6, 1996)
<http://guru.cose.georgetown.edu/-denning/crypto/Future.html> [hereinafter Future of
Crypto] (arguing that key escrow should be the new paradigm of cryptography, not
crypto anarchy).
' See Cyphernomicon, supra note 269 T 11.4.4.
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a means for tax evasion, money laundering, espionage (with digital dead
drops), contract killings, and implementation of data havens for storing
and marketing illegal or controversial material. ' '"5 To argue that national
security would be in jeopardy from such a scenario would clearly be an
understatement. The proliferation of strong crypto would solve the prob-
lem of confidentiality for companies and individuals worldwide, but we
have to ask ourselves, at what cost?' 7 As May writes:
The State will of course try to slow or halt the spread of this technolo-
gy, citing national security concerns, use of the technology by drug
dealers and tax evaders, and fears of societal disintegration. Many of
these concerns will be valid; crypto anarchy will allow national secrets
to be trade freely and will allow illicit and stolen materials to be traded.
An anonymous computerized market will even make possible abhorrent
markets for assassinations and extortion. Various criminal and foreign
elements will be active users of CryptoNet. But this will not halt the
spread of crypto anarchy.2
Ultimately, crypto anarchy is an international threat, brought on by
the proliferation of strong crypto. Denning strongly advocates an interna-
tional approach to the problem of crypto anarchy. 8 Such an approach
would have to provide for both secure transnational communications and
sufficient means for electronic surveillance of criminal and terrorist
activity by governments "Key escrow has emerged as one approach
that can meet the confidentiality and data recovery needs of organizations
while allowing authorized governments access to fight terrorism and
crime. ' 'u
VI. CONCLUSION
It may roundly be asserted that human ingenuity cannot concoct a cipher
which human ingenuity cannot resolve.
- Edgar Allen Poe2
See Future of Crypto, supra note 273.
276 See id.
m See Manifesto, supra note 268.
zn Id.
2" Id. at 9-10.
= Id.
28 EIXAR ALLEN POE, A Few Words on Secret Writing, in ESSAYS AND MISCEL-
LANIES (James A. Harrison ed., 2d ed. 1979).
' Edgar Allen Poe was an amateur cryptographer of some regard, among other
things. See ANDRE BAcARD, THE CoMPtrER PRvACY HANDBOOK 73 (1995). See also
Daniel W. Dukes, The Legend of Poe the Cryptographer (visited Nov. 16, 1997)
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Cryptography has been and largely still is an enigma to the vast
majority of the world. Rapid advances in computers and other related
technology, however, have forced many of the leading governments of the
world to not only try to understand the new technology now guiding this
centuries-old "secret writing" but sort through the multitude of complex,
diverse, and often emotionally charged issues that cryptography engenders.
This by no means amounts to a simple wave of a magic wand, especially
in the United States, whose very fabric of existence as a democratic state
is predicated on broad notions of personal privacy and free speech.
However, hard choices must be made. Unfortunately, every time the
United States has a lasting peace, it becomes complacent about security
and overly focused on economic growth. History, however, has repeatedly
admonished the United States that such a mistake may have mortal
ramifications.
There are, no doubt, shortcomings in prior efforts to control the
proliferation of crypto, most notably the confusing and contradictory
ITAR. That alone is not a sufficient reason to dismantle the entire
apparatus, as some have suggested. A viable threat to national security
exists; it is not simply smoke and mirrors. It is as absurd to assert, as
opponents to crypto controls often do, that there is no threat because the
government cannot empirically, definitively demonstrate it, as it is for the
government to merely state in a perfunctory manner that there is a threat,
"trust us." Both sides must give a little. Within a very short time the
power to control information, for good or evil, will be unparalleled in
world history. It may well become the ultimate power.
In this now technologically rich world it is unlikely if not impossible
to entirely confine the effect of export controls to locations purely abroad,
or to only select locations of the world. Fallout is natural, yet should not
be a subterfuge for complete decontrol. Like most things in American
<http://www.nadn.navy.mil/EnglishDept/poeperplex/cryptop.htm> (describing Poe's efforts
to mix his interest in cryptography with his writing); CODEBREAKERS, supra note 21,
at 783-93 (comprehensively detailing Poe's contributions to the craft of cryptography
and noting that Poe's story, "The Gold-Bug remains unequalled as a work of fiction
turning upon a secret message"). "That the early American writer should have become
interested in cryptology seems almost inevitable. He urged exactness in thinking, talked
about "ratiocination," and wrote stories, like The Purloined Letter, that demanded a
methodical logic. But he also wrote poems of an unearthly beauty and the macabre
Tales of the Grotesque and Arabesque, and he looked into such irrational subjects as
mesmerism and phrenology. Cryptology, more than other subjects, is split the same
way. It beams the hard bright searchlight of reason upon the phenomena it investigates.
At the same time it glimmers with the pale, eerie, indistinct moonshine of mysticism
and spooky powers." Id. at 783.
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politics, issues are measured in extremes. Fortunately, this political
methodology of "extreme advocacy" has generally contributed toward
moving this country toward a balanced, prudent, and middle ground on
all issues. Cryptography should fair no differently. A middle ground must
be sought.
Complete decontrol of crypto is insane. Complete control is equally
insane. Key escrow, escrowed encryption, or key recovery then becomes
the "key" to national security. Hyperbole aside, escrowed encryption is
unlikely to be a serious attempt by the government to "back-door Big
Brother." Because if it were, the government has really gone about it in
all the wrong manner. One could only surmise, given the technologically-
advanced intelligence apparatus that the United States indisputably pos-
sesses, that there must be easier and less "public" ways to spy on mom
and her apple pie.
Escrowed encryption appears to be an attempt to maintain the status
quo, not one-up-it. Escrowed encryption allows a limited proliferation of
strong crypto to those who desperately need it, but without seriously com-
promising security. Export controls limit the availability of U.S.-made
crypto, much like export controls limit the availability of Patriot Missile
technology despite similar systems being available to one degree or
another worldwide. Additionally, "[k]ey escrow is a technology that offers
tools that would assure no individual absolute privacy or untraceable
anonymity in all transactions... [allowing] individuals to choose civil
society over an anarchistic one." The government is charged with the
awesome and, per se, speculative job of protecting the security of this
country. To err on the side of being too conservative with the control of
a potentially dangerous technology is, in fact, reasonable and in all
likelihood the preferred choice of most Americans.
"National security" is a nebulous concept and should be chal-
lenged.' But it also must be respected if a legitimate threat is pre-
sented. It is not, despite the invective, an either/or proposition (that is,
constitutional rights versus security; economic growth versus security,
etc.). All interests, from privacy and free speech to security and eco-
nomics must be respected and a policy on the control of strong crypto
must be a balance of their respective needs.
This Note as a whole makes a relatively simple statement: do not
misunderstand or underestimate the national security interest in controlling
strong crypto. It is vital; it is significant; and it compels respect.
See Future of Cryptography, supra note 273.
To be sure, the invocation of "national security" has been abused in the past;
however, that does not, and should not, foreclose all future invocations. That would be
plainly unreasonable and, moreover, extremely dangerous.
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